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ABSTRACT
A survey of the author’s internship experience with Power Systems 
Engineering, Inc. during the period September 1980 through August, 1981 
is presented. During this one year internship, the author was assigned 
to two engineering projects. One involved design of a 480 MW power 
plant. The other was the design of a 8.2 MW induction generator for 
cogeneration.
The author’s activities during this period can be categorized into 
two major areas. First, technically oriented, he designed protective 
relaying and SCADA systems for the projects. Secondly, he assisted the 
Project Manager in project management activities such as project pro­
gress and cost control.
The intent of this report is to prepare a training manual for PSE 
young engineers. It covers both technical guidelines for power plant 
design and nonacademic professional codes. Although this report is 
primarily written for young engineers, it can also be used as a refer­
ence by older and experienced engineers.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
It is the intent of the Doctor of Engineering degree program to 
prepare the student either as a professional and qualified engineer 
with strong business and administrative background or as a manager with 
enough technical background. The internship, as required in the program, 
is designed to expose the student to the real industry environment and 
to bridge the gap, if any, between the academic and the industrial 
environments.
The objectives of the internship are as follows:
(1) To become familiar with the structure of the organization, or­
ganizational goals and objectives, departmental responsibilities and 
functions, project management procedures, technology assessments and 
engineering decisionmaking procedures, and employee's performance eval­
uation and motivation.
(2) To make an identifiable contribution in the Electrical Engi­
neering area of projects undertaken by the company.
(3) To gain experience in the non-academic technical and business 
activities of the company and to be aware of the industry standards, 
ethical practices, and the interactions between the company and the in­
dustrial environments.
In addition, the following considerations have also been taken into 
account in selecting a successful engineering firm to intern with:
(1) In Taiwan, it is very important either to improve the effi­
ciency of energy usage or to find new energy sources other than petro­
leum since there are very few resources.
(2) In Taiwan, being an experienced engineer is almost the only 
way to become an engineering manager. Consequently, ever since I en­
rolled in the Doctor of Engineering program, I have been preparing my­
self to be a qualified engineer with sufficient business and administra­
tive background to be an engineering manager; not a manager with an 
engineering background. Considering all these factors, I chose to have 
my internship with Power Systems Engineering, Inc., a Houston based 
professinal engineering and construction services organization.
1.1 History of Power Systems Engineering, Inc.
Power Systems Engineering, Inc., was founded early in 1969 by 
Mr. Albert J. Smith and Mr. Thomas C. McMichael, who at that time had 
over 50 years of combined experience in the design and installation of 
power generation equipment and industrial power systems. Since its 
inception, the firm has stamped itself as an innovator and a pioneer of 
high efficiency power generation in the power and process industries. 
Its first project was the design, construction, and the operation of a 
300 MW combined cycle power generation plant, the largest base load 
combined cycle gas turbine power plant ever built at that time.
Today the firm provides engineering and project management services 
wherever required. Through one of its subsidiaries, Power Operating 
Company, the firm also provides services of operating and maintaining 
most types of power generating, steam or heating and cooling facilities 
for clients. In response to the critical demands imposed on industry 
by the shift in fuel cost and availability today, Power Systems Engi­
neering is providing coal, lignite, and nuclear plant technology logis­
tics and other energy-related services.
The firm's goals are innovation in high efficiency power genera­
tion, being owner-operator of cogeneration and heat recovery systems, 
and to maintain a sound and stable financial structure commensurate to 
the requirements of the firm's objectives.
Today, the firm's objectives include:
(1) To serve a great variety of energy-related industrial clients 
and meet their specific requirements by the most cost effective methods.
(2) To build up a highly qualified business team to develop co­
generation projects.
(3) To support energy intensive industries with energy resources 
such as coal, lignite and others.
(4) To continue development of a highly qualified engineering 
staff in all disciplines capable of implementing the design, engineering 
and construction of energy-related projects.
(5) To become an internationally recognized professional firm.
The firm's philosophy is based on innovation backed by thorough
feasibility studies, conservative design and the use of proven compo­
nents and systems best suited for a particular project. As an engi­
neering consultant, the firm always tries its best to employ procedures 
and techniques which are cost effective and result in overall savings 
for its clients. Power Systems Engineering has designed and built a 
wide range of industrial power and utility projects from small to very 
large, complex systems, and has constructed numerous chemical plants, 
compressor stations and other chemical and petroleum industry oriented 
installations.
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the overall structure of the firm, with
deparmental functions. It is clear that the organization form is of 
modified matrix type. Generally, one of the department managers is 
assigned as the Project Manager for a particular project, depending 
upon the nature of the project. This type of organizational structure 
has the following advantages for this particular firm:
(1) The project team can respond more quickly and move effective­
ly to the client’s needs.
(2) It is a flexible structure such that each employee can take 
more than one responsibility at a time, if required.
(3) Each individual employee takes wider and higher diversity of 
assignments and gains broader experience in all phases of project de­
velopment than might be feasible in a larger firm.
(4) A closer personal relationship at the business level is pos­
sible between employees, clients, and the employer.
1.2 Project Management
For any project undertaken, Power Systems Engineering offers ser­
vices covering all phases of project development: definition of the 
needs, conceptual development, feasibility studies, environmental per­
mitting and licensing strategy and applications, preliminary engineer­
ing, design engineering, specification of equipment, procurement, cost 
control, complete working schedule, financing and leasing, construc­
tion management, start-up, operation and maintenance and others.
Engineering and corporate assignments are directed and oriented 
in a project manner. A Project Manager is assigned to act as liaison 
between the client representative and all organizational functions in 
the firm. This provides a single source of responsibility to the
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client such that the client’s project can receive the maximum support 
from all corporate services. A responsible project engineer or engi­
neers from each discipline as needed are assigned to handle all engi­
neering requirements and are responsible to the Project Manager. Under 
the project engineer are design, drafting, and logistic teams. Each 
individual project engineer also acts as liaison with the client for 
his discipline through the Project Manager.
1.3 Scope of Internship Assignments and the Report
During a one year internship, I was assigned to two project teams 
for the following projects:
(1) Engineering and design of a 480 MW combustion gas turbine gen­
eration plant in Saudi Arabia.
(2) Engineering and design of a 8.2 MW induction generator for co­
generation in southern Texas.
My contributions to the firm included project electrical engineer­
ing design as well as engineering services. As an electrical engineer, 
I conceptually and detail designed protective relaying for the 480 MW 
power plant, wrote specifications of equipment, designed microprocessor- 
based supervision control and data acquisition (SCADA) and sequence of 
events (SOE) systems. I also implemented relay coordination and ven­
dor's bid evaluations, both technically and economically. As an assis­
tant to the engineering service manager, my accomplishments included 
designing a complete engineering progress control chart for electrical 
engineering discipline, helping the project engineers to process and 
expedite most of the procurement, and assiting the project manager to 
prepare cost control charts and monthly progress reports.
Another assignment during my internship was to standardize both 
technical and managerial guidelines for young engineers. This report 
summarizes and highlights the results of this assignment. It consists 
of two parts. Part one, including Chapter 2 through Chapter 5, covers 
technical fundamentals of electrical generation plant design. Part two, 
including Chapters 6 and 7, discusses business aspects of engineering 
projects and some engineering managerial considerations for young 
engineers.
CHAPTER 2
SOME FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEM DESIGN
As stated in Chapter 1, the scope of engineering business includes 
marketing, planning, management, scheduling, control, and all technical 
activities. In this chapter only technical design tools such as short 
circuit current calculation, ampacity of electrical conductors, tran­
sient performance of conductors, instrument transformers, and the R-X 
diagram, will be covered.
Among.these, the short circuit current calculation is the most im­
portant. It includes maximum and minimum current calculations under 
fault conditions. Both of these calculations will be discussed in Sec­
tion 2.1 in detail. The selection of electrical conductors may gener­
ally be made on the basis of voltage drop, power loss, maximum allowable 
temperature rise, or mechanical strength. Each of these characteris­
tics will be covered under Sections 2.2 and 2.3 separately. Instrument 
transformer performance and the R-X diagram are two key topics in power 
system relaying. They will be elaborated on under Sections 2.4 and
2.5 separately. Although this chapter and the following three chapters 
emphasize only technical aspects of engineering practices, by no means 
is it implied that other aspects are not important and can be neglected. 
In fact, it should be pointed out that economic considerations are 
usually at least as important as technical requirements. For example, 
in designing the substation buses to resist short circuit stresses, an 
economic balance should be reached by providing means for limiting 
possible short circuit forces by increasing bus spacing, or by changing 
bus arrangements. Frequently even landscaping becomes a deciding
factor. Similarly, the application of protective relays to the system 
components is essentially a compromise between the cost of protection 
and the risk of no protection at all.
2.1 Fault Current Calculation
It is not feasible to design an electrical system completely free 
of faults. Even the best designed electrical system occassionally ex­
periences short circuits resulting in high fault currents. Therefore, 
protective devices such as circuit breakers and fuses should be applied 
to isolate faults before any severe damage or long service interruption 
occurs. On the other hand, other parts of the system should be capable 
of withstanding the mechanical and the thermal stresses resulting from 
maximum flow of fault currents through them. The magnitude of fault 
currents are usually established by calculation. Most of the system 
components are specified and selected using the calculation results.
2.1.1 Two Simplifying Assumptions
The basic relationship used in determining fault current is Ohm’s 
Law. There are several methods or algorithms for fault current calcu­
lation. However, certain simplifying assumptions are customarily made 
for engineering design purposes [1]. An important assumption is that 
the fault is bolted, that is, it has zero impedance. It should be 
recognized, however, that actual faults often involve arcing, which 
reduces the fault current magnitude due to arc resistance or impedance. 
Furthermore, a three-phase fault is generally assumed because this 
type of fault generally results in the maximum short circuit current 
available in a circuit. In high voltage systems the three-phase fault 
is frequently the only one calculated. In a low voltage system, ground
currents are often less than the rated load currents, but can be very 
destructive. This condition leads to the requirement for line-to-ground 
fault calculation.
Impacts of these two assumptions on engineering design are not only 
simplifications of the calculation but also increases of safety margins 
on all the equipments selected on the basis of the calculation results.
2.1.2 Fault Current Calculation Results and Their Applications
It is well known that an electrical fault current is usually of an 
asymmetrical wave form whose magnitude varies with time after the 
fault. Then a question like "When should the fault current be calcu­
lated?" arises naturally.
According to IEEE Standard 141-1976, short circuit currents may be 
calculated at the following recommended times:
(1) The first cycle: First cycle maximum symmetrical values are 
always required. They are often the only values needed for low voltage 
systems and for fuses in general. These values are usually related to 
circuit breaker momentary (closing and latching) capabilities.
(2) From 1.5 to 4 cycles: Maximum values are required for high 
voltage circuit breaker applications. These values are generally re­
lated to contact interrupting capacities of high voltage circuit 
breakers.
(3) About 30 cycles: The reduced magnitude of the fault current 
gives the minimum available fault current supplied by the system. 
These minimum fault currents are important in protective device coor­
dination in the system.
Generally speaking, the maximum fault current values are used to
select adequate interrupting ratings and to check the ability of system 
components to withstand both mechanical and thermal stresses. The 
minimum values are needed to check the sensitivity requirements of pro­
tective relays. For overall coordination of system protective devices, 
both the maximum and the minimum values are often required. Sometimes, 
the minimum values are estimated as fractions of the maximum values for 
the sake of simplicity. In this case, only the maximum magnitude of 
fault current should be calculated.
2.1.3 Sources of Fault Current
Power frequency currents which flow during a fault come from elec­
trical rotating machines. Rotating machines involved in fault calcula­
tions may be divided into the following categories:
(1) Synchronous generators
(2) Synchronous motors and condensers
(3) Induction machines
(4) Electric utility system
The fault current from each rotating machine source is limited by 
the impedance of the machine and the impedance between the machine and 
the fault. The impedance of a rotating machine is not a simple value, 
but is complex and varying with time. For purposes of fault current 
calculations, industry standard practice [1 ] has established the follow­
ing guidelines for the application of this variable reactance.
For synchronous machines, the subtransient reactance (X^ j) should 
be used to determine fault current during first cycle after fault 
occurs; the transient reactance (X£), to determine fault current 
after several cycles (about 5 cycles at 60 Hz); the synchronous
reactance (X^), to determine the current flow after a steady-state con­
dition is reached. As most fault protective devices, such as circuit 
breakers and fuses, operate well before steady-state conditions, is 
seldom used in calculating fault currents for applications of these de­
vices. For induction machines, only the subtransient reactance (X^) 
is used. This value is about equal to the locked-rotor reactance. 
Therefore, the fault current from an induction machine is approximately 
equal to the full voltage in-rush current of the machine, if shorted at 
the terminals.
Generally speaking, the current contributed to a fault from the 
utility system appears to be merely a small increase in load current 
to the remote and relatively large central station generators, and this 
current contribution tends to remain constant. Consequently, the uti­
lity system is usually represented by a constant voltage source behind 
a constant impedance whose value is determined as follows:
cvi_i) 2
Z syg (ohm)
Available short circuit level in MVA from 
the utility sytem at the point of connection
Where Vi_]i is the system line-to-line operating voltage in KV.
2.1.4 Fault Curent Calculation Procedure [1]
The procedures for calculating system short circuit currents con­
sist of the following steps:
(Step 1) Prepare system one-line diagram.
This diagram should show all sources of short circuit currents and all 
significant circuit elements.
(Step 2) Collect and convert impedance data to a common base for 
for all significant circuit elements.
A significant part of the preparation for a short circuit current study 
is establishing the impedance of each circuit element, and converting 
them to the same base. Sources of impedance values are nameplates, 
handbooks [3], standards [1 ] [4], manufacturers' catalogs, direct 
contact with the manufacturer and others.
The major elements of impedance include transformers, busways, 
cables, conductors, and rotating machines. There are other circuit 
impedances such as those associated with circuit breakers, instrument 
transformers, bus connections and structures, etc., which are usually 
negligibly small in high voltage (above 1 KV) systems. However, in 
low voltage systems, particularly at 208V, omission of these impedances 
may result in over-conservative results. All the impedances, except 
those for rotating machines, are assumed to be constants throughout 
the fault current calculation. The impedances of rotating machines 
depend upon the purpose of the study as discussed in further detail 
under Step 5.
Also, it is normal practice to disregard all static loads such as 
lighting, electric heating and so on in the network despite the fact 
that they are in parallel with other network branches. This is so be­
cause system load currents are usually negligibly small compared with 
the high fault current. This assumption implies that from a system 
operating point of view, the fault is essentially a disturbance around 
the prefault operating point. In other words, the prefault system 
voltage (Eo) can be taken as the system nominal voltage at the moment 
fault occurs. Therefore, when using the per-unit system, the driving 
voltage is equal to 1 . 0 per unit if the voltage bases are equal to
system nominal voltages. This will greatly simplify the calculation 
in Step 5.
(Step 3) Prepare the system impedance diagram.
Impedance information gathered in Step 2 should be entered on the one 
line diagram obtained from Step 1. For many short circuit studies at 
medium or high voltages, and for a few at low voltage, it is sufficient­
ly accurate to ignore resistances and use reactances only. However, for 
many low voltage calculations resistance should not be ignored because 
the calculated currents would be unnecessarily over-conservative.
Resistance data are definitely required for calculations of X/R 
ratios when applying high and medium voltage circuit breakers, but they 
should be kept on a separate drawing called resistance diagram [1 ].
(Step 4) Combine impedances from sources to fault location. 
This step is the most straightforward one, but it may be most time con­
suming too.
(Step 5) Calculate short circuit currents to anticipated fault 
locations.
This step uses different impedances for the rotating machines to calcu­
late the short circuit currents depending upon the purpose of the 
study. Industrial applications of short circuit calculation results 
can be classified into the following four general categories:
(a) First cycle duties for fuses and low voltage (below 1 KV)
circuit breaker.
(b) First cycle duties for high voltage circuit breakers (1 KV
and above).
(c) Interrupting duties for high voltage circuit breakers.
(d) Short circuit currents for time delayed relays.
Each of these categories will be discussed subsequently in further 
detail.
For first cycle duties of fuses, switches, and low voltage circuit 
breakers, the short circuit current should be calculated in accordance 
with ANSI C37.13, ANSI C37.41, NEMA AB, and NEMA SG latest standards. 
With low voltage fault calculations, all motors should be considered 
regardless of horsepower size. However, the standards allow using an 
equivalent reactance to represent a group of low voltage induction or 
synchronous motors fed from a low voltage substation. The equivalent 
reactance is 0.25 p.u. based on the lump sum KVA rating of the machines. 
For other machines, whether generators or motors, the subtransient re­
actance should be used in the equivalent network.
After the first four steps above, a single driving impedance Zf for 
each fault location can be obtained. Then the symmetrical short circuit 
current can be calculated as follows:
■^sym = So p.u.
Z f
For those low voltage circuit breakers whose short circuit ratings 
are expressed in symmetrical rms currents, this is the minimum required 
capacity for satisfactory performance. For those whose ratings are 
given in terms of total rms currents, the symmetrical short circuit cur­
rent obtained above should be multiplied by a multiplication factor ac-
y
cording to ANSI Standard C37.13. This factor depends upon the f/R f
y
ratio at fault location. If f/R^ ratio is equal to or less than 6 .6 ,
y
the factor is 1. If f/Rf is greater than 6 .6 , a straight factor of 
1.15 can generally be used for purposes of selecting the breakers.
For fuse application, the multiplication factor should be obtained from 
ANSI Standard C37.41.
For first cycle duties of high voltage circuit breakers, the cal­
culation shall be implemented in accordance with the latest ANSI C37.5 
and C37.010 standards. With the calculations, only motors with 50 HP 
or more ratings should be considered. Table 2.1 lists the reactances 
for rotating machines that should be used in the calculation.
After the first four steps stated above, a single impedance Xf for 
each fault location can be obtained. Then the first cycle asymmetrical 
short circuit duties can be calculated as follows:
Itot = — x 1 - (>
Xf
This is the short circuit duties for comparison with high voltage (above 
1 KV) circuit breaker momentary ratings (total current rating basis) or 
closing and latching capabilities (symmetrical current rating basis).
There are significant differences between total current and symmet­
rical current calculations of high voltage circuit breaker interrupting 
duties. However, in both calculations, only motors rated 50 HP or more 
should be considered. The reactances used for the rotating machines 
is shown in Table 2.1. For these calculations, the resistance network 
is also necessary. In the resistance network each rotating machine 
resistance must be multiplied by the same factor as its corresponding 
reactance multiplier from Table 2.1. Consider first the duties for 
the high voltage circuit breaker rated on the total current basis. 
Reduce the reactance network to a single equivalent reactance Xf. De-
Y T7
termine f/Rf and o/Xf ratios. Then select the multiplying factor for 
f/Rf correction from curves shown in figure 2.1 [5]. To use the curves
ROTATING m a c h i n e  r e a c t a n c e  m u l t i p l i e r s
JL JO B NO. N/A DATE
Power System s 
Engineering, Inc.
P.O. Box 19398 
Houston. Texas 77024
TYPE OF ROTATING 
MACHINE MOMENTARY INTERRUPTING
All turbine generators: all 
hydrogenerators with amortisseur 
windings, all condensers
Hydrogenerators without amortisseur 
windings
All synchronous motors 
Induction Motors ( = 1800 RPM) 
Above 10 0 0 HP 
250 < HP 1000 HP 
50 < HP 250 HP 
HP <  5 0 HP 
Induction Motors ( = 3600 RPM) 
Above 10 0 0 HP 
250 < HP iz. 1000 HP 
50 < HP 250 HP 
HP <  5 0 HP
1.0 X"d
0.75 X"d
1.0 XMd
1.0 X"d
1.2 X"d
1.2 X"d 
neglect
1.0 X"d
1.0 X"d 
1.5 X"d 
neglect
1.0X"d
0.7 5 X"d
1.5 X"d
1.5 X"d
3.0 X"d
3.0 X"d 
neglect
1.5 X"d
1.5 X"d
3.0 X"d 
neglect
See Tablel8 IEEE Std. 141-1976, page 197 for typical
reactance values of induction and 
synchronous machines, in per unit of 
machine KVA ratings
Table 2.1 ROTATING MACHINE REACTANCE MULTIPLIERS
MULTIPLYING FACTORS FOR 
TOTAL CURRENT RATING BASIS DEVICES
y JL JO B  NO. N/A DATE
Power System s 
Engineering, Inc.
Sh 1 of 1
P.O. Box 19398 
Houston. Texas 77024
Multiplying Factors (Total Current Rating 
Basis) for Three-Phase Faults Fed 
Predominantly from Generators Through 
No More Than One Transformation (Local) 
[From ANSI C37.5-1969 (R 1974)]
Multiplying Factors (Total Current Rating 
Basis) for Three-Phase and Line-to-Ground 
Faults Fed Predominantly Through Two or 
More Transformations (Remote) 
[From ANSI C37.5-1969 (R 1974)]
Figure 2.1 MULTIPLYING FACTORS FOR TOTAL 
CURRENT RATING BASIS DEVICES
the following information must be known:
(a) Three-phase or single-phase short circuit study?
(b) Rating interrupting time of the circuit breaker used.
Minimum contact parting times usually used in 60 Hz systems 
are defined following:
Rated interrupting time (cycles) 8 5 3 2
Contact parting time (cycles 4 3 2 1-1/2
(c) Fault point ^f/Rf ratio
(d) Proximity of generators. The proximity of generators deter­
mines the choice between graphs for fault fed predominantly from local 
or remote sources. Unfortunately, for hybrid type sources, that is, 
both significant local and remote sources exist, no single multiplying 
factor is available from related standards. Different methods have 
been suggested for industrial applications. One of the most usual 
methods is given in Huening’s paper [6 ]. Then multiply o/Xf by the 
multiplying factor selected. This is the calculated total rms current 
interrupting duty to be compared with the circuit breaker interrupting 
capability.
Next consider the high voltage circuit breaker rated on the symmet-
F Y
rical current basis. Calculate o/Xf and f/Rf ratios and select the 
multiplying factor from Figure 2.2 as in the total current basis case. 
Then multiply o/Xf by the multiplying factor selected. The result is 
an interrupting duty only if the multiplying factor for o/X^ is 1 .0 . 
The rated symmetrical interrupting capablity of the circuit breaker is 
calculated as,
minimum required symmetrical = ^o x multiplying factor x rated max. E 
interrupting capability Xf EQ
MULTIPLYING FACTORS FOR SYMMETRICAL 
CURRENT RATING BASIS DEVICES
BY JL JO B  NO. N/A DATE
Power System s 
Engineering, Inc.
P.O. Box 19398 
Houston, Texas 77024
R
3 CYCLE 
'C IRCUIT 
BREAKER
i.O 1.1 
MULTIPLYING FACTORS
1.3
M ultiply ing Factors for Three-Phase Faults Fed Predominantly from Generators 
Through No More Than One Transformation (From IEEE Std 320-1972)
multiplying factors
M ultiply ing Factors for Three-Phase and Line-tcGround Faults Fed Predominantly 
Through Two or More Transformations (From IEEE Std 320-1972)
Figure 2.2 MULTIPLYING FACTORS FOR SYMMETRICAL CURRENT RATING BASIS DEVICES
The short circuit study for time delayed relays, known generally as 
30 cycle study, is intended to investigate whether there are sufficient 
fault currents to operate relays. Consequently, the network used is 
often a minimum source representation and includes only generators that 
contribute fault current through the relay under consideration to the 
fault point. The generators should be represented by their transient 
impedance. All induction motors should be omitted in the calculation.
It becomes obvious that the complete procedure of short circuit 
study is tedious and long-hand calculation will soon become impractical 
and impossible as the size and complexity of the system increase. Digi­
tal computers are generally used for major fault studies in the industry.
2.2 Steady-State Performance of Electrical Conductors
Under normal operating conditions, the prime considerations in the 
applications of electrical conductors are current carrying capacity 
(defined as ampacity), and maximum allowable voltage drop, and energy 
losses. The cost of the energy losses through resistance is also im­
portant in the case of conductors carrying heavy currents at low volt­
ages such as, for instance, in the electrochemical industry. In such 
cases, it may pay to use the conductors at less than their ampacity. 
If the selection of conductor size is based on energy loss and conduc­
tor cost, then the most economic choice of conductor according to 
classical economic theory is the one that makes the annual cost of the 
resistive losses equal to the annual interest on capital cost of the 
installed conductor material plus depreciation [7].
For substation buses, ampacity and energy loss are two factors 
which normally govern the selection of the conductors. For overhead
transmission lines, ampacity and voltage drop determine the size of 
the conductor, and the voltage is considered in choosing the spacing 
and insulation of the line. Because of the extra high voltage generally 
used in transmission systems, corona plays a major role in the design 
of transmission systems. Besides these two factors, the overall system 
operation requirements may supersede all the considerations discussed 
so far and place a dominant limitation on the selection of the trans­
mission conductor. For example, system stability may require a minimum 
conductor size. For overhead distribution in urban area, close voltage 
regulation and continuous service are two important factors to be con­
sidered. In addition, because of the heavy load involved, operating 
costs per unit of current must be kept as low as possible. Therefore, 
in the design of urban distribution systems, much study should be given 
to the most economical arrangement of the line, conductor sizes, and 
the methods of operationg, etc. For overhead distribution in rural 
area, it is extremely important that the line be low in initial con­
struction cost, and still give satisfactory and reliable service. As 
a result, long spans are usually used. For building wires and cables, 
the determining factor is the ability of the insulation of the conduc­
tors to withstand heat without being deteriorated or damaged. On the 
other hand, the National Electric Code specifies that the size of 
feeder conductors should be such that the voltage drop will not be 
more than 3% for power loads and 2% for lighting loads or combined 
lighting and power loads.
In this section, calculation of ampacity for bare conductors will 
be discussed. Since the ampacity of an insulated conductor is limited
by the maximum allowable temperature rise of the insulation used, it 
cannot be represented by a simple formula. In addition, ampacities can 
be easily obtained from NFPA Standard No. 70 [8 ]. Therefore, it will 
not be further considered thereafter. Neither voltage drop nor power 
loss calculation will be covered since they are very straightforward.
2.2.1 Ampacity of Bare Conductors
Electrical current carrying capacity of a bare conductor is deter­
mined by the tempeature rise resulting from the power loss of conduction 
and any other heat gained by the conductor. Since most equipment to 
which connections must be made from the conductor is designed to operate 
at a temperature rise of 30°C above 40°C ambient in accordance with NEMA 
and IEEE standards, it is undesirable to operate the conductor at a 
temperature that would cause heat to flow into the apparatus. Such heat 
may raise the temperature of that apparatus to a damaging point. In 
addition, the conductor may begin to oxidize at an excessively rapid 
rate at temperatures higher than 80°C. It is general practice to limit 
the maximum operating temperature below 80°C for copper conductors, be­
low 100°C for aluminum conductors, below 95°C for single layer ACSR 
(aluminum conductor, steel-reinforced) and 105°C for multi-layer ACSR.
The heat caused by electrical losses in a conductor is dissipated 
primarily by convection and radiation. Under steady-state conditions, 
the rate of heat dissipatipn is equal to the rate of heat supply.
12R + Q, = Qr + Qc 
where I = ampacity in amperes
Qc = convected. heat loss in watts/ft.
0
0 r = radiated heat loss in watts/ft.
Qs = heat gain from sun in watts/ft.
R = nominal AC resistance at operating temperature tc in ohms/ft. 
Table 2.2 summarizes atmospheric data required for ampacity calculation. 
Each of these items is discussed as follows:
9
(A) Convected heat loss Qc:
For natural convention cases, that is, no wind:
Q = 0.072 D0 *75 (t - O 1 , 2 5 at sea level
C a
Qc = 0.283 d^’5 at altitudes
(1 0 , 0 0 0 feet and above)
For forced convection cases:
CL = [1.01 + 0.371 (DdV)0 *52] K (t - t )  if 0.1 1 D dV < 1,000L. ■ — C d u___
u u
*Q„ = 0.1695 [ DdV ]0 # 6 K (t -t) if 1,000 < DndV < 18,000
>- — C a U___
u u
where D = conductor diameter in inches
D0 = conductor diameter in feet
tc = conductor operating temperature in degrees C 
ta = ambient temperature in degrees C 
d = air density at tc in lb./cu. ft.
V = air velocity in feet per hour
u = absolute viscosity of air at (tc+ta )/2 in lb./(hr.-ft.) 
K = thermal conductivity of air at (tc+ta)/2 
Among these parameters, d, u, and K can be read from Table 2.2.
#
(B) Radiated heat loss Qr :
Q_ = 0.138 D e [(K )4 - (K )4]
100 100
where e = coefficient of emissivity; 0.91 for black conductors,
0.23 for new conductors and 0.5 for average oxidized 
conductor.
CMOSPHERICAL DATA FOR AMPACITY CALCULATION
JL JO B NO. N/A DATE
Power System s 
Engineering, Inc.
P.O. Box 19398 
Houston, Texas 77024
TABLE A VISCOSITY, DENSITY AT SEA 1EVELTO 15,000 FT, AND THERMAL CONDUCTIVITY OF AIR
TEMPERATURE / K \ ‘
I _  1 
V ioo y
AESOIUTE
VISCOSITY,
u
DENSITY, d
M l- ---
THERMAL
CONDUC-
TIVITY,
K !■'
K SEA LEVtt 5,000 FT 10,000 FT 15,000 FT
32 C j./ 3 55.55 C.C415 0.0807 a n i  7 1 0.0554 0.0455 0.00739
41 5 273 59.73 0.C42! 0.0793 0.0660 0.0545 0.04.47 0.007 50
‘ 50 ■ C 2 63 *4 1 4 0.04 27 0.0779 0.0648 0.0535 0.0439 0.00762
59 1 5 2S8 68.80 0.0433 0.0765 0.0636 0.0526 0.0431 0.CC773
68 in 292 7370 0.0439 0.0752 0.0626 0.0517 0.04 24 0 00784
77 25 296 7c. 86 0.0444 0.0740 0.061 6 0.0508 0.04 T7 C.C0795
86 30 303 E*.29 0.0450 0.0728 0.0606 0.0500 0.041 1 0.00807
95 35 305 89.99 0.0456 0.0716 0.0596 0.0492 0.0404 0.0051 e
104 40 313 95.98 0.0461 0.0704 0.0586 0.0484 0.0397 0.00830
113 45 3 l 6 102.26 0.0467 0.0693 0.0577 0.0476 0.0391 0.00841
122 50 323 1 OS.85 0.0473 0.0683 0.0568 0.0469 0.0385 0.00852
131 55 328 1 15.74 0.0478 0.0672 0.0559 0.0462 0.0379 0.00864
140 60 333 122.96 0.0484 0.0661 0.0550 0.0454 0.0373 0.00875
149 65' 338 130.52 0.0489 0.0652 0.0542 0.0448 0.0367 0.00886
1 58 70 34 3 138.41 0.0494 0.0643 0.0535 0.0442 0.0363 0.00898
167 75 348 146.66 0.0500 0.0634 0.0527 0.0436 0.0358 0.00909
176 80 353 155.27 0.0505 0.0627 0.0522 0.0431 0.0354 0.00921
185 85 358 164.26 0.0510 0.061 6 0.051 3 0.0423 0.0347 0.00932
194 90 363 173.63 0.0515 0.0608 0.0506 0.041 8 0.0343 0.00943
203 95 368 183.40 0.0521 0.0599 0.0498 0.0412 0.0338 0.00952
212 1 00 373 193.57 0.0526 0.0591 0.0492 0.0406 0.0333 0.00966
H f  — c b s o lu t e  v i j c o i i f y ,  I b / ' h r j ^ f t ) .  .
P/ = density, lb of csir/ftJ.
kj = thermal conductivity of oir, watts/(iq fi'i'C) c! // = [le +  )»}/2.
to = ombient temperature C.
It — conductor temperoture °C.
TABLE B HEAT-TR ANSMISSION FACTOR FOR 
ALTITUDES ABOVE SEA LEVEL
ELEVATION ABO VE MULTIPLIER FOR
SEA LEVEL, FT VALUES IN TABLE C
0 1.00
5,000 1.15
10,000 1.25
15,000 1.30
TABLE C TOTAL HEAT RECEIVED BY SURFACE 
AT SEA LEVEL NORMAL TO SUN’S RAYS
SOLAR 
ALTITUDE, 
Hc, DEGREES
q.. WATTS/SO FT
CLEAR
ATMOSPHERE
INDUSTRIAL
ATMOSPHERE
5 21 J 12.6
10 4 0.2 22.3
15 U .2 30_5
20 64.4 39.2
25 71.5 46.6
30 . 77.0 53.0
35 £ 1 _5 57.5
40 £4.5 61.5
45 £7.4 64.5
50 90.0 67.5
60 92.9 71.6
70 9 r- 0 75.2
80 95.8 77.4
90 96.4 78.9
TABLE D ALTITUDE AND AZIMUTH IN 
DEGREES OF SUN AT VARIOUS LATITUDES 
AT DECLINATION OF 23.0 DEGREES, 
NORTHERN HEMISPHERE, JUNE 10 AND JULY 3
LOCAL SUN TIME
DEGREES 10:00 A.M. 12 NOON 2:00 P.M.
.ATITUDE He Z. H. z. H. Z.
20 62 78 87 0 62 282
25 62 88 88 180 62 272
30 62 98 83 180 62 262
35 61 107 78 180 61 253
40 60 1 15 73 180 60 245
45 57 122 68 180 57 238
50 54 128 63 180 54 232
60 47 137 53 180 i ^ 22 3
70 40 143 43 180 | 40 217
Table 2.2 ATMOSPHERICAL DATA FOR AMPACITY CALCULATION
Kc = conductor operating temperature in degrees Kelvin 
Ka = ambient temperature in degrees Kelvin
(C) Solar heat gain Qs :
#
Qs = a q A sin 8 and 
6 = cos - 1 [(cos Hc) cos (Zc-Ze)] 
where a = coefficient of solar absorption; 0.95 for black conduc­
tor, 0.23 for new conductor and 0.5 for average oxidized 
conductor.
q = total solar and sky radiated heat in watts/ft.
6  = effective angle of incidence of sun's rays 
A = projected area of conductor in sq. ft./linear ft. = D/12 
Hc = altitude of sun in degrees 
Zc = azimuth of sun in degrees
Ze = aximuth of conductor in degrees; 270° for E-W line and 
180° for N-S line.
Among these, Hc and Zc are available from Table 2.2.
It is important to notice that this equation is derived on the bases of 
the following two assumptions:
(1) Heat loss carried off by conduction through supports and con­
nections is negligibly small. This is usually true in most cases.
(2) The conductor is isolated, that is, no proximity effect. Un­
fortunately, this is generally not true. However, the equation can 
still be used to calculate conductor ampacity if an effective resistance 
value including proximity and skin effects is used for R.
2.3 Transient Performance of Electrical Conductors and Supports
Under fault conditions, mechanical considerations rather than
electrical requirements usually govern the selection and design of 
electrical installations, such as substation buses and supports, over­
head lines, and cables. For medium voltage substations, the size of 
buses is generally dictated by mechanical stresses caused by short cir­
cuit currents. For high voltage buses, where currents are relatively 
lower and the phase spacing is larger, the deflection under short cir­
cuit of the conductor usually determines the bus size. A good practice 
is to limit the maximum deflection of the bus to ■ ^ q- of the span 
where only two supports are used and qq~ where three or more supports 
are used. For overhead lines, fault currents are more likely to cause 
thermal damage, which may be followed by loss of mechanical strength of 
the conductor, than direct mechanical damage. However, the high elec­
tromagnetic forces of fault currents play an important role in the de­
sign and selection of line supports, spacers, dampers, and other equip­
ment. For all insulated wires and cables, heating caused by short 
circuit current is a deciding factor in their applications. On average, 
the life of cable and wire insulation is about halved and the failure 
rate is doubled for each 10°C increase in operating temperature. It 
is the intent of this section to cover various stresses, including 
mechanical stresses, thermal stresses, and other stresses under abnormal 
operating conditions.
2.3.1 Short Circuit Forces and Other Mechanical Stresses
Conductors carrying electric currents will exert forces on each 
other according to Ampere’s Law. The basic formula for force between 
two infinite parallel conductors is: Fs =5.4  1^ I2
D (107)
Where Ij and 12 are current in each wire, D is center-to-center spacing 
of two conductors in inches, and Fs is the force acting on the conduc­
tors in pounds per foot. This equation is directly applicable to 
direct current systems.
Calculation of forces set up by alternating currents is somewhat 
complicated by the fact that fault currents are usually asymmetrical 
and are decreasing with time. There are various methods to calculate 
short circuit forces in industry. Some advocate the theory of natural 
frequency of vibration of the bus itself and possibility of resonance 
with the alternating current frequency. If resonance should occur, 
very great forces might result. This method involves data on buses, 
bus clamps, insulators, bases and structure which would be practically 
endless for all possible combinations. In fact, for reasons of clear­
ance and economy, high voltage substations are generally designed with 
relatively long spans and relatively flexible structures. As a result, 
the natural frequencies of such high voltage bus systems are normally 
much lower than the f r e q u e n c y  of the current in the bus. Even for 
those applications where resonance might occur, the problem can be eas­
ily solved by proper utilization of dampers or loose scrap conductors. 
Consequently, the resonance theory is unnecessarily complicated for 
general applications. Others advocate the use of the average force 
developed over a half cycle instead of that delivered by the wave peak. 
Since the deflection of the conductor subjected to successive impulses 
is proportional to the average magnetic force rather than to the maximum 
force [9]. This theory is true only if the average force is maintained 
indefinitely and the forces are a series of impulses. Even worse, there
is no clearly defined safety margin for all design based on this 
theory.
The use of the first half-cycle peak value of the current wave is 
a sound and sensible basis for the worst case design. This gives the 
maximum forces as successive peak currents are smaller due to various 
decrements. Since part of this instantaneous force is absorbed by in­
ertia of the conductor system, a safety factor is inherent. Generally, 
either a line-to-line or a three-phase fault is assumed because these 
types of fault will result in the maximum short circuit forces available 
in a single phase or a three phase system.
In the subsequent paragraphs, various short circuit force formulas 
are derived on the base of peak current value during the first half­
cycle assuming that no decrement will be present during this period. 
A fully offset wave is assumed for asymmetrical calculations, which 
provides a ratio of between the rms value of the composite current 
wave and the rms value of the corresponding symmetrical current wave 
if no offset is present.
(A) Line-to-Line Faults:
In the case of a symmetrical fault the fault current does not 
have any offset, the peak value of the wave is equal to yfl times the 
rms value.
Fs - 5.4 ( 7 ?  Is ) 2 
D(107)
= 10.8 Ig2 
D(107)
Where Is is the rms symmetrical current value.
For an asymmetrical fault that is fully offset, if the rms symmet­
rical value is given, the peak current equals 2 Is 
Fg = 5.4 (2/T Ig)2 
D(107)
= 43.2 Is2 
D(107)
If the rms asymmetrical value over the first half-cycle is given, the 
peak value equals 1.63 Ia as shown in Appendix 1.
Fs =5.4 (1.63 Ia)2 
D(107)
“ 1 4 -4 ! a 2 
D(107)
where Ia is the rms asymmetrical current over the first half-cycle.
(B) Three-Phase Fault:
The usual three-phase conductor arrangement is a flat configura­
tion with equally spaced conductors side by side vertically or horizon­
tally. It is proven in Appendix 1 that the maximum possible force will 
be impressed on the center conductor, phase B in our case, and the 
short circuit must occur 45° after zero current value in phase B. Any 
other combination of circumstances gives a smaller force than this con­
dition. At the instant of short circuit, phase B current will have the 
value of 0.7071 (that is, sin 45°) times the prefault current peak 
value; phase A current will have the value of 0.2588 (sin 15°) times 
and phase C current will have - 0.9659 (sin 255°) times the prefault 
current peak value. The instantaneous values of their transient di­
rect current components will be the negatives of the above amounts.
The maximum force will then occur a half-cycle after the instant of 
short circuit [10] . Neglecting the decrement during the first half­
cycle and multiplying phase current A by phase current B and B by C, 
the total force acting on conductor B is
F» ■ 1 8 -7 v 2
D(107)
where Ip is the peak value of the symmetrical alternating current com­
ponent of the fault current.
In the case where the rms symmetrical value is given, the peak 
value equals^2~ Is
Fs - 18.7 ( /2 Is)2 
D(107) 
- 37~* ! s 2 
D(107)
From Appendix 1, it is known that the maximum force obtainable 
from a three phase fault is v/3/2 times that from a single phase fault, 
assuming that the current per phase of the two types of circuits are 
the same. However, on the same circuit, the three phase short circuit 
currents are usually greater than those of line-to-line faults and the 
short circuit forces are accordingly larger. Therefore, if given the 
half-cycle rms value of the fault current, the forces on phase B con­
ductor can be calculated as following:
Fg = 14.4 (0.866) Ia 2 
D(107)
" 1 2 ‘5 Xa2 
D(107)
By a similar analysis, the maximum force on either outside conduc­
tor can be derived. Table 2.3 summarizes the maximum forces due to 
various currents, faults, and conductor configurations. It may be 
noticed that a symmetrical three phase fault is not covered in this 
table. This is so because a symmetrical three phase fault is impossible 
since the currents are 1 2 0 ° out of phase and no time can be selected so 
that all three are simultaneously zero. It should be pointed out that 
all formulas are derived on the basis of the following two assumptions:
(i) The largest dimension of the conductor is negligibly small 
compared with the center-to-center distance between the conductors. 
If this assumption is not true, then a shape correction factor 
should be applied to the force obtained from these formulas as 
shown in Figure 2.3.
(ii) The conductors are assumed to be long, straight, and parallel 
to one another. When bends, crossovers, short lines, etc., must 
be considered, no simple and generally applicable formulas are 
available. Each application should be studied and analyzed 
individually.
Of extreme importance in calculating short circuit forces is that 
the short circuit current information obtained from short circuit 
studies should not be misused. Remember that in computing short cir­
cuit currents, the subtransient reactance of rotating machinery, ex­
cept hydraulic generators, is used for the first cycle duty. Therefore, 
the amperes obtained are rms symmetrical containing no direct current 
component. This component must be added to the calculated value before
short circuit force analysis. On the other hand, if the results from a
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Table 2.3 SHORT-CIRCUIT FORCE ON BUS CONDUCTORS
SHORT-CIRCUIT 
CURRENT, /, 
G IVEN AS
TYPE OF FAULT CONFIGURATION
FORCE ON 
CONDUCTOR
M A X IM U M  f, 
IN POUNDS 
PER FT.
(D in INCHES)
D-C
A B 
o o
r— D—H
A or B F _  5.4 \- 
D (107)
RAAS symmetrical
Single-
Phase
Symmetrical
A B 
o o A or B F _  10.8 /2 
~  D (107)
RMS symmetrical
Single-
Pnase
Asymmetrical
A B 
o o 
h-D-H
A or B F _  43.2/2 
~  D (107)
RMS asymmetrical
Single-
Phase
Asymmetrical
A B 
o o
H—d —-!
A or B /: _  u -4 Is ■
D (107)
RMS symmetrical
Three-
Phase
Asymmetrical
A B C  
o. o o
hD-r-DH
B F 37.4 /2 
D (107)
RMS asymmetrical
Three-
Phase
Asymmetrical
A B C  
o o o
H-d -t -dH
B F _  /2 
~  D (107)
RMS symmetrical
Three-
Phase
Asymmetrical
A B C  
o o o
k-D-n*-DH
A or C F _  34.9 I2 
~  D (107)
RMS asymmetrical
Three-
Phase
Asymmetrical
A B C  
o o o
h-d -4*-d H
A or C F _  n .6 / 2
D(IO-)
RMS symmetrical
Three-
Phase
Asymmetrical
V D D /
X  XO O
A k-d—; c
A, B or C F 37.4 r- 
~  D (107)
RMiS asymmetrical
Three-
Phase
Asymmetrical
D °  D 
A —1 C
A, B or C F _  12.5 I2 
~  D (107)
NOTE: Single-phase notation indicates either a single-phase system or a 
line-to-line fault on a three-phase system.
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S-3 _  AIR SPACE BETWEEN STRAPS 
a+b SUM OF SIDES
F=force between two equal long parallel bars 
Fl=force between two long parallel straight round 
conductors (see section on short circuit forces)
To use the curves, F 1 must be computed according to 
the discussion on forces due to short circuit currents
before F can be determined.
The above curves have been drawn neglecting skin 
effect and assuming that the current density is uniform 
over the section of conductors.
Figure 2.3 SHAPE CORRECTION FACTORS FOR STRAP BUSES
short circuit study are expressed in terms of rms asymmetrical values, 
it is necessary to ensure that these values are those immediately after 
short circuit and before the decrement sets in.
In addition to the short circuit forces described above, the con­
ductor is also subjected to the loads from its own weight, ice, and 
wind. The weight loading is quite straightforward. Ice and wind 
loading are determined by geographical location. This country is di­
vided into three districts for which standard loading conditions are 
specified in National Electric Safety Code [11]. The loading for the 
various districts is shown in Figure 2.4. The wind load on the con­
ductor is
H = P(D + 2t)
12
where D = diameter of the conductor without ice in inches 
t = thickness of ice in inches from Figure 2.4
P = horizontal wind pressure in pounds per square foot from 
Figure 2.4 
H = wind force in pounds per foot.
The weight of ice on the conductor is 
I = 1.24t (D + t) 
in which I = weight of ice loading in pounds per foot.
Then the loaded weight on the conductor is the resultant of the 
vertical and horizontal weights plus the proper constant specified in 
Figure 2.4. The wind load is generally in the horizontal direction; 
the ice weight and the conductor weight are in the vertical direction; 
the short circuit forces can be either horizontal or vertical depending 
upon the physical layout of the conductor. Expressed in mathematical
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| Fig 250-1
I General Loading Map of United States with Respect
I to Loading of Overhead Lines
1
Table 250-1. Ice, Wind and Temperature
Loading Districts 
(For use with 
Rule 250B)
Extreme Wind 
Loading 
(For use with 
Rule 250C)
Heavy Medium Light
Radial thickness of 
ice (in) 0.50 0.25 0 0
Horizontal wind 
pressure in lbs 
per sq ft 4 4 9 See Fig 250-2
Temperature (°F) 0 + 15 + 30 + 60
Constant to be 
added to the re­
sultant in pounds 
per foot:
All conductors 0.30 0.20 0.05 0.0
From NESC Std. C2-1981, page 227 
Figure 2.4 ICE AND WIND LOADING ON ELECTRICAL CONDUCTORS
form, the resultant load on the conductor is:
Fh 2 + Fv 2 + K
where Ft = resultant load on the conductor in pounds per foot
= horizontal load on the conductor in pounds . per foot 
= sum of H and Fs , if applicable.
Fv = vertical load on the conductor in pounds per foot
During short circuits, the stresses imposed upon the conductor may 
be lateral, longitudinal, or torsional. These stresses are transferred 
to the insulator and other conductor support hardware. Of these three 
stresses, the lateral stress is probably the most destructive as it 
applies a strong cantilever force on the support system. In designing 
the conductor support systems, the following considerations can be 
taken as general guidelines.
(1) Try to keep the insulator in compression, if possible. This 
is because porcelain is roughly ten times stronger in compression than 
in either tension or cantilever.
(2) Good substation bus design, especially rigid metal bus, re­
quires the use of flexible connectors at certain points in the bus. 
In general, they should be used at all terminals of machines, transform­
ers, circuit breakers, disconnect switches and at intervals in long 
straight bus runs as required for thermal expansion.
Before leaving these topics, it is proper at this moment to discuss 
the calculation of the deflection of metallic buses and the mechanical 
stresses on the bus support systems. Because the loads to which they
= sum of I, the conductor weight, and Fs , if applicable
K = constant specified in Figure 2.4
are subjected, that is, bus weight, short circuit forces, ice and 
wind, are uniformly distributed along their lengths, bus conductors 
are generally considered as uniformly loaded beams. For conductors 
requiring only two supports, deflection and stress calculations can be 
made by using the formulas for a simple beam. If more than two supports 
are required for a single length of bus, the formulas for a continuous 
beam apply. Formulas for these two cases are summarized in Table 2.4.
2.3.2 Transient Thermal Stresses
Electrical conductors are occasionally subjected to current over­
loads due to either short circuits or emergency conditions.
Under short circuit conditions, the ultimate conductor temperature 
depends upon (1 ) the magnitude of fault current, (2 ) the duration of 
fault current flow, (3) the material and cross sectional area of the 
conductor, and (4) the • conductor temperature before short circuit 
occurs. Generally speaking, the duration of fault current flow is so 
short that for most practical purposes it can be assumed that no heat 
loss occurs by convection and radiation. Consequently, the temperature 
rise is determined by only the specific heat of the metal, the size of 
the conductor and the heat input. The specific heat varies as the 
temperature increases. Therefore, it is difficult to determine accu­
rately the temperature rise of a conductor under short circuit condi­
tions. For a particular type of conductors, manufacturers usually 
provide the short-time current temperature equation. For bare conduc­
tors, the maximum safe short circuit currents can be easily calculated 
from this equation, if given maximum allowable conductor temperature. 
Standard industrial practice recognizes a temperature of 300°C as the
BUS CONDUCTOR DEFLECTION 
AND STRESSES FORMELAS
iy JL JO B  NO. N/A DATE
Power System s 
hJUi 1Engineering, Inc.
P O. Box 19398 
Houston, Texas 77024
deflcction in inches 
h- = load in lb /in. of
/ = moment of inertia, inches ,<J 
Si * bending moment in pound-inches 
S*section modulus, inches®
/'•fiber stress in Ib/sq in.
/ —maximum allowable fiber stress in lb/sq in. 
(The value of minimum yield strength is com­
monly used.)
©Maximum deflection occurs in the end spans and is only slightly less than that for a continuous 
beam of 2 spans.
5,Maximum moment and fiber stress for simple beams occur at the center of the span.
©Maximum moment and fiber stress for beams fixed at both ends occur at the points of support. 
©Maximum moment and fiber stress for continuous beams occur at the second support from each end.
k»,.h
total uniform load in pounds {wl) 
I « span in inches 
E  — modulus of elasticity, lb /sq in.
Table 2.4 BUS CONDUCTOR DEFLECTION AND STRESSES FORMULAS
maximum allowable for determining short time rating of buses; 340°C 
for all-aluminum conductors and 645°C for ACSR conductors. For insu­
lated conductors, the IPCEA has established maximum allowable short 
circuit temperatures for various types of insulation.
Emergency loading normally occurs in transmission or distribution 
systems due to coincidence of peak loads with high summer ambients, 
shifting of additional loads to an already loaded conductor, use of 
high loadings to prevent icing and others. The procedure of determin­
ing maximum overload currents under emergency loading conditions is 
the same as that under short circuit conditions. In an emergency load­
ing application, caution should be given to the fact that the effect of 
heating is cumulative.
2.3.3 Low Voltage Conductors: Special Considerations
As stated in Section 2.1, predictions of possible short circuit 
currents for high voltage circuits, where arcs are of a sustained 
character, can be made fairly accurately. However, in low voltage (600 
volts or less), the effect of fault impedance is such that the actual 
current resulting from a fault is usually much smaller than that calcu­
lated. If this difference is not recognized, unnecessarily high costs 
for bus structures may be incurred.
Caution should also be exercised in applying relay current-time 
characteristics for the settings of protective relaying on low voltage 
lines that may be subjected to arcing burndown. The settings should 
be such that the relay will operate before any arcing burndown occurs.
2.3.4 Vibration of Overhead Conductors
Vibration is a frequent cause of failure or serious damage on
overhead distribution and transmission lines. Because of the importance 
of such lines, even occassional failures must be avoided. Vibration 
of overhead conductors may be divided into two general classes:
(i) Resonant vibrations of high frequency and low amplitude. This 
type of vibration is most destructive and may be caused by either 
fatigue due to successive reflection of vibration or chafing. In 
either event, the failure usually takes place at the point of ver­
tical support, and only occasionally elsewhere, such as at a dead­
end, and even less frequently at a joint.
(ii) Vibrations of low frequency and high amplitude, usually known 
as dancing or galloping. This type of vibration is caused by 
passage of a current of air over the conductors perpendicular to 
the major axis. Damage caused by dancing conductors is usually 
due to flashover caused by conductors whipping about at high 
amplitudes and reducing the clearances.
To date, the most popular methods of minimizing the damage due to 
vibration involve either improvements in design of supporting clamps, 
or addition of accessories to the line. These methods come under three 
general categories as follows:
(i) Suspension clamps designed to permit vibration to pass through 
them without damaging reflection.
(ii) Reinforcements or armor rods at the suspension clamps which 
will increase the effective section modulus at the point of support.
(iii) Dampers which function to absorb vibration energy and pre­
vent destructive vibration from building up.
2.4 Applications of Instrument Transformers
Instrument transformers are used both to protect personnel and 
apparatus from high voltage and to allow reasonable insulation levels 
and current carrying capacity in relays, meters, and instruments. 
Instrument transformer performance is critical in protective relaying, 
since the relays are only as accurate as the instrument transformers. 
Generally speaking, instrument transformers for metering and instrumen­
tation require higher accuracy than those for protective relaying. In 
this section, only those instrument transformers for protective relaying 
will be covered. Special emphasis will be given to performance estima­
tion of current transformer for relaying applications.
2.4.1 Applications of Current Transformers
The major criteria for selecting a current transformer ratio are 
the continuous current ratings of the connected relays and of the sec­
ondary windings of the current transformer itself. In practice, with 
load current normally flowing through phase relays, the ratio is usually 
selected so that the secondary output is around 5 amperes at maximum 
primary load current. In general, the performance of current trans­
formers is not so critical for transmission and distribution line pro­
tection. However, it is most critical for differential protective 
schemes, particularly under transient conditions.
Since most relays commonly operate at currents of several times 
the maximum normal current of the current transformer, performance up 
to 2 0 times normal current is the basis for accuracy specification. 
At the same time there is usually little need to limit the ratio error 
to less than 1 0 % and hardly any need to limit the phase angle for
relaying. Consequently, the basis for classification of performance 
for relaying is an error of 1 0 % at any current from 1 . 0 to 20 times 
normal current. Instead of a description of accuracy, ANSI accuracy 
classification is really a description of how much voltage the trans­
former can supply to the external circuit or burden. The performance 
of current transformers is then specified in terms of the secondary 
voltage which can be supplied by the transformers at 20 times normal 
current without exceeding the error limit of 10%. In addition to volt­
age ratings, the ANSI standard [12] also uses two letters, C and T, 
for class designation. Letter C means that the effective internal 
impedance is only secondary resistance. This implies that the exciting 
current by-passed through the exciting branch can be rather easily cal­
culated if one has the saturation curve at hand. The C classification 
covers bushing current transformers with uniformly distributed windings, 
and any other transformers whose core leakage flux has a negligible 
effect on the ratio within the defined limits. On the other hand, 
letter T means that even if the internal reactance of the transformer 
is known, the calculation of the exciting current by-passed in the 
exciting branches is most tedious or even impractical. It is usual 
that performance of the transformer under this class should be deter­
mined only by test. The T classification covers most wound-type trans­
formers and any others whose core leakage flux affects the ratio 
appreciably.
For relaying service application, the following current transformer 
data should be obtained from the manufacturer.
(1) Relaying accuracy classification.
(2) Mechanical and thermal short time (1 second) ratings. Both 
ratings define rms values that the transformer is capable of 
withstanding and should be checked against system fault current 
at the location of installation.
(3) Resistance of the secondary winding between the winding 
terminals.
(4) For Class C transformers, typical excitation curves on log-log 
coordinate paper are required. For Class T transformers, the manu­
facturers should supply typical overcurrent ratio curves on rec­
tangular coordinate paper.
It is important to note that the above ANSI ratings are applicable 
to the full winding only. Where there is a tapped secondary, a propor­
tionately lower voltage rating should be used for each tap.
From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the errors in ratio 
of a current transformer depend upon the total impedance connected to 
the secondary of the transformer. Unfortunately, many relays have var­
iable impedance. For these applications, analysis of the transformer 
performance is usually based on an equivalent value at normal current. 
This can be justified on the basis that the burden at higher current 
is usually less and thus the current transformer will perform better 
than expected from the equivalent burden.
A current transformer’s performance is measured by its ability to 
reproduce the primary current in terms of the secondary without satura­
tion and large errors. Two common methods for performance estimation 
are excitation curve method and ANSI transformer relaying accuracy 
class method.
(A) Excitation curve method:
This method consists of the following steps.
(Step 1) Determine total burden on the transformer using the 
following expressions:
(1 ) with wye-connected current transformers:
Zf- = 1.13 R]_ + Z + R for three-phase faults
Zt = 1.13 (2R^) + Z + R for single phase-to-ground faults
(2 ) with delta-connected current transformers:
Z-f- = 3 (1.13 Ri + Z + R) for three-phase faults 
Zt = Z(1.13 Ri + Z) + R for single phase-to-ground faults 
where R^ = one-way lead resistance from the transformer to 
relays in ohms at 75°C 
Zt = total burden in ohms on the transformer 
1.13 = a multiplier used to accommodate temperature 
rising during fault 
Z = burden impedance of any devices connected or 
reflected to the current transformer in ohms 
R = internal resistance of the transformer in ohms 
(Step 2) Determine secondary CT voltage required, Es, to 
deliver a given amount of secondary current, say Is.
(Step 3) From excitation curve of particular tap of the 
transformer being used, determmine excitation current Ie 
corresponding to the required secondary voltage, Es.
(Step 4) Determine the percentage error for the transformer. 
Applications of this method will be illustrated in Section 4.3, under 
the topics of differential protection.
(B) ANSI Transformer Relaying Accuracy Class Method:
In contrast with excitation curve method, this method gives only 
a qualitative appraisal for current transformer applications. To en­
sure the ratio error of a Class C transformer being less than 10% with 
maximum secondary fault current Is flowing, the following criterion 
should be met.
NV + 100 R > Is (Z + R) 
where N = proportion of total current transformer turns in use
V = voltage rating class, that is, Class C voltage
2.4.2 Applications of Potential Transformers
Two major criteria for selecting a potential transformer are the 
system voltage level and the basic impulse insulation level as required 
by the system on which they are to be used. ANSI Standard [12] recog­
nizes three groups of potential transformers for different capabilities 
and connections.
Standard accuracy classification of potential transformers range 
from 0.3 to 1.2, representing percent ratio corrections to obtain a 
true ratio. These accuracies are normally high enough so that any 
standard transformer will not create any problem for relaying applica­
tion as long as it is adequately used. Potential transformers are 
usually connected in open delta for balanced system; in wye-wye when 
line-to-neutral loading or metering is required; in wye-open delta for 
ground detection in an ungrounded system; and any specific connection 
as required by a particular relay.
2.5 The R-X Diagram
As the system complexity increases and higher operation reliability
is required, it is an increasing trend to replace single operating 
quantity relays with multiple operating quantity relays. Surely this 
will increse performance exactness of protective relaying systems. 
But it raises the question, "How can we relate the characteristics of 
these more complicated relays to different system operation conditions?" 
The answer to this question will be found in the R-X diagram. Before 
examining this powerful tool, a brief review of ohmic relay character­
istics is first given.
An ohmic relay is defined as a relay which responds to the follow^* 
ing three variables: voltage, current, and phase angle. In general 
the relay will respond to at least three of the following four torque- 
producing components:
(1) Voltage component (torque proportional to V2)
(2) Current component (torque proportional to I2)
(3) Product component (torque proportional to VI F(0))
(4) Control spring torque
Thus a general torque equation for the relay will look like:
Torque = ± Kj V2 t  K£ I2 t  K3 V I f (r, 6 ) +
where Torque is positive for a contact-closing torque
K4 is a spring torque assumed to be constant
K_i, K2 , and K3 are independent design constants of either sign and
variable magnitudes.
r is the design angle of maximum torque.
Since a good example can serve hundreds of words, the following example 
will be used to illustrate the value of the R-X diagram. Considering 
a directional relay with voltage restraint, set K2 = K4 = 0 and select
a minus sign for K^, positive sign for K3 and F(r.6 ) = sin 
(90° + r-e).
Torque = K3 V I sin (90° + r-e) - Kx V2 
Consequently, the relay characteristic is 
K3 V I sin (90° + r-6 ) = V2 
K3 I sin (90° + r-6 ) = K2 V, if V i  0 
It is obvious that the relay characteristics are a function of system 
operation parameters V and I which are usually unknown under transient 
conditions. Even more complicated, prefault system operating conditions 
affect post-fault conditions, and different types of faults result in 
different system transient conditions for the same initial conditions. 
One key to this problem is the R-X diagram.
Remember V/l = Z.
Z = K3 sin (90° + r-e)
Kl
It is obvious that system impedance seen by the relay should be less 
than K3 /K1 sin (90° r-6 ) in order to operate the relay. From this 
example, it is clear that the value of the R-X diagram lies in the 
following two facts: relay characteristics can be simply shown and 
system conditions can also be shown on the same diagram as proven in 
the subsequent paragraph.
To illustrate how system conditions can be represented on the R-X 
diagram, a two machine system is shown on Figure 2.5(a). On the same 
figure is also shown the impedance seen by the relay located at substa­
tion A for different fault locations and one loading condition. By 
similar analysis, other system operation conditions can be shown on 
the diagram. Figure 2.5(b) illustrates loci of loss-of-excitation in
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a synchronous generator.
After both the relay characteristics and system conditions have 
been plotted on the same diagram, the proper protective scheme for the 
system can be decided from the R-X diagram. This will be illustrated 
later in Chapters 3 and 4.
CHAPTER 3 
GENERATOR PROTECTION
Surely the frequency of generator failure is low with modern design 
practices and improved materials. Yet failure can occur and may result 
in severe damage and long outages if not properly protected. The de­
gree of protection for each generator is mainly a result of economic 
compromise. It should be carefully weighed against possible risk if 
no protection were applied, and acccording to the size and the impor­
tance of each individual machine in the system. Overprotection is as 
costly as underprotection. Optimum generator protection can only be 
obtained by individual engineering analysis of the particular installa­
tion. Since there are very few [4] provisions for generator protection, 
the design of generator protection will heavily rely upon individual 
engineering experience. This chapter will cover some recommended mini­
mum protective features applicable to generators of various types and 
sizes together with some additional considerations in designing genera­
tor relaying schemes. Since the connection of a generator to an exist­
ing power system will dictate the type of grounding and protective 
system employed, system connection will be discussed briefly, too.
Generator faults can be either phase-to-ground or phase-to-phase 
faults, either in the stator winding (internal faults) or in the leads 
external to the machine terminals. Most generator faults will involve 
ground, and the amount of fault current will depend upon the method 
used to connect the generator to the system. Internal faults generally 
develop as a ground in one of the phase windings because of insulation 
failures and may occasionally involve more than one phase. Insulation
failures occur due to overvoltage or reduced insulation strength, or 
more frequently a combination of both. Overvoltage caused by lightning 
and switching transients should be protected against by surge arrestors 
and will not be covered in this chapter. Reduced insulation strength 
is usually due to abuse and aging. Both result in drying out and bak­
ing the insulation until it loses its elasticity and approaches the 
carbonized stage. The most frequent types of abuse are overloading, 
lack of attention to the cooling system, and allowing dust to accumu­
late. All short circuits in the stator require the repair or replace­
ment of the damaged stator coils. Consequently, it is extremely impor­
tant to limit the duration of a stator fault for the following reasons:
(1) To prevent igniting the insulation material which may result 
in a fire.
(2) To prevent burning of the iron, possible costly replacement, 
and longtime service interruption.
3.1 Philosophy of Generator Protection
In order to minimize damage, when a short circuit develops in 
stator windings or in the connections up to and including the breakers, 
which connect the generator to the rest of the system, these breakers 
must be tripped immediately. This will prevent any outside source 
from supplying current to the short circuit. To stop a synchronous 
machine from feeding its own short circuit, it is also necessary to 
disconnect and collapse the field, and to de-energize the prime mover 
of the machine from its source of power. If the neutral of the genera­
tor is grounded through a neutral circuit breaker, the simultaneous 
tripping of this breaker along with the main breaker and the field
circuit will help to limit the duration of arcing at a ground fault. 
It is general practice to trip all these breakers through a hand-reset 
a u x i l i a r y  or lockout relay. This same relay should also shut down the 
prime mover and energize fire extinguishing equipment if required.
Overcurrent relays, which protect against ground faults only, may 
have very sensitive current settings. However, selectivity require­
ments may prevent the use of low current or fast time settings. It 
is also necessary to protect against those faults which start as phase- 
to-phase faults before the ground relays can operate. Unfortunately, 
phase-to-phase overcurrent protection has inherent limitations from 
the standpoint of sensitivity, selectivity, and speed of operation 
since overcurrent relays must be set above maximum load current and 
must also have time settings which should be coordinated with other 
relays in the system. For these reasons ordinary overcurrent relaying 
is seldom satisfactory for generator protection. Because of its selec­
tivity and sensitivity, differential protection is generally accepted 
as standard for the protection of all generators above 1 MVA. The 
minimum size of machine for which it is desirable to provide differen­
tial protection is determined by balancing the cost of the protection 
against the importance of the machine. Differential protection is 
strongly recommended for smaller machines under the following condi­
tions [4] .
(1) Any KVA ratings, 5KV and higher
(2) 501 KVA and larger, 2.2 KV and higher
(3) Machines paralleled with larger machines or a system, which
are differentially protected.
(4) Machines, regardless of size, which are important to the op­
eration and reliability of the system.
In the instances where the cost of differential protection is not 
economically justifiable, current balance relaying can provide an ac­
ceptable substitute. In addition to winding faults, this type of re­
laying will also afford protection against single-phase operation.
Most field circuits of modern generators are usually operated un­
grounded so that a single ground will not damage the machine at all. 
However, since a potential second ground may short part of the field 
winding and cause severe mechanical vibration, a ground indicating 
equipment should be used to detect the occurrence of the first ground 
and initiate an alarm.
The principles of external fault backup in generator protective 
relaying is to minimize damage from a feeder or bus fault in case the 
first line relays normally expected to protect these circuits fail to 
trip the proper circuit breakers. This backup relaying should be 
chosen to provide coordination with those first line relays.
For a turbine generator, a preheating schedule during startup may 
call for running the unit at reduced speed for several hours with the 
field energized. An induced voltage at reduced frequency will exist 
on the stator winding during this period. Adequate relays should be 
selected to detect possible faults during this reduced frequency 
operation.
For a hydro-generator, a sudden drop of full load may result in 
an overspeed of 14% or more of the rated value. The terminal voltage 
may reach as high as 200% or more if AC overvoltage protection is not
provided. Therefore, overvoltage protection is essential and strongly 
recommended for all hydro-generators.
3.2 System Connection [13] [14]
The method of connecting a generator to an electrical system dic­
tates the type of neutral grounding and protective schemes employed. 
In spite of various connection methods, all of these ramifications can 
be classified under two categories; direct-connected system and unit 
system, insofar as system protection is concerned.
(A) Direct-Connected System:
This system applies where at least some of the power generated 
will be distributed at the generator terminal voltage. It can be 
either solidly grounded or low resistance and reactance grounded. In 
its application, it has to be assured that sufficient ground fault 
current is available to operate system protective devices.
Where the ground fault capacity of the machine is approximately 
equal to the level required for the system protection, the machine 
could be solidly grounded although this is not generally recommended
[13]. For installations where the possible ground fault level exceeds 
the values required by the system protection devices, the maximum 
ground fault current should be reduced to a level of 1 0 0  ampere minimum 
and 150% maximum of full load current by the use of grounding resistance 
or reactance. Usually, reactance grounding is applied where the gener­
ator supplies four-wire feeders at generated voltage, and resistance 
grounding, where three-wire feeders are supplied at generated voltage.
(B) Unit System:
In this system, each generator is directly connected to its
individual transformer bank, the low-voltage side being delta, and the 
high-voltage size, wye. So far as ground fault currents are concerned, 
each machine is isolated from the others and the system. Hence, the 
generator ground fault currents can be limited to a very low value, 
but not less than the minimum necessary to actuate a protective relay
[14]. A variation of this arrangement is sometimes used where two gen­
erators supply a common transformer bank.
The optimum method of limiting the ground fault current of a unit 
system is to insert the primary of a distribution transformer with a 
resistor across its secondary between the star point and the ground 
for a wye-connected generator. The resistor and the transformer are 
usually sized to limit the ground fault currents to a level of 5 to 15 
amperes. For delta-connected generators [13] and unit generator system 
installations where there is no switching at generated voltage, poten­
tial transformer neutral grounding has also been applied successfully. 
In spite of these variations, both are known as high resistance ground­
ing. Another alternative for limiting the ground fault current of a 
unit system is low reactance grounding. The neutral reactor will gen­
erally be selected so that ground fault current will not exceed the 
three-phase fault level.
3.3 Fault Protection
Generator fault protection functions to detect any faults either 
internally in stator windings or externally in terminal leads but with­
in the generator relaying zone. It usually includes differential pro­
tection and stator ground fault protection. It is general practice 
that all fault protection devices should be arranged to trip the
generator main circuit breaker, the field circuit and shut down the 
prime mover.
(A) Differential Protection (Device No. 87G)
In differential protection, the currents in each phase, on both 
sides of the machine, are compared in a differential circuit. The 
term "differential" is properly applied only to the connection of cur­
rent transformers so that the net input to the relay is the difference 
between input and output currents. There are various modifications of 
the differential protection schemes, depending upon the type of relay 
used and the connection of the machine itself. However, in all these 
schemes, it is always good practice to use current transformers with 
the same characteristics wherever possible, and to avoid connecting any 
any other equipments such as meters and other relays to these circuits. 
It should also be noted that differential relays do not protect any 
open circuits, or turn-to-turn short circuits in most of these schemes.
Where perfectly matched current transformers at opposite ends of 
the windings are available, overcurrent relays in differential connec­
tion can provide excellent selectivity as well as very fast tripping. 
Actually, very few current transformers, even though they are commer­
cially identical, have the same characteristics, especially under ex­
ternal fault conditions. Furthermore, the rapid increase in the com­
plexity and loading of integrated power systems requires a more dis­
criminative line of differential relays on each generator to all exter­
nal faults without sacrificing selectivity and sensitivity.
The percentage differential relay meets all these requirements. 
This relay has two or more restraint windings which produce opening
torques and desensitize the relay to high external fault currents. 
The percentage indicates the unbalanced current required to operate 
the relay as a percentage of the restraint currents. There are two 
types of percentage differential relays generally used for generator 
protection: constant percentage and variable percentage differential 
relays. A variable percentage differential relay is designed to be 
more sensitive and faster on light internal faults, but less sensitive 
on heavy external faults. However, it costs about 25% more than a con­
stant percentage relay. It is generally recommended for the following 
applications:
(i) The situation where heavy saturation currents in current 
transformers may be encountered.
(ii) Full-voltage transformer energization during black start or 
following out-of-step synchronizing. This is so because these condi­
tions will produce DC current flow in the machine. Since the time 
constant of rotating machinery is large, it may produce current trans­
former saturation, probably occurring at different times for the two 
current transformers in a given phase, that will persist for many 
cycles after the initial disturbance.
Most generators have wye-connected windings. Figure 3.1 shows a 
differential protective scheme for these generators, including DC trip­
ping circuit. This scheme can protect against phase-to-phase fault 
whether generator neutral is grounded or not. With a solidly grounded 
neutral, the differential relay will operate on phase-to-ground short 
circuits in any part of the winding except a small portion very close 
to the neutral, depending upon relay sensitivity and setting. If
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current-limiting devices are inserted in the neutral, the effective­
ness of differential relaying against phase-to-ground fault will be 
diminished slightly and there will be a somewhat greater portion of 
the winding next to the neutral for which no protection can be provided 
by the differential scheme. If the machine neutral is ungrounded, the 
scheme can still protect against phase-to-ground fault if the system 
is grounded elsewhere and the fault current is greater than the relay 
setting. It is quite obvious that the differential scheme will not 
respond to line-to-ground fault in a unit system. Figure 3.2(a) shows 
a differential scheme for a wye-connected generator having only one 
neutral lead brought out of the machine. In this scheme, residual 
line current, that is, the phasor sum of the line currents, is balanced 
against the neutral current. Consequently, it will protect against 
phase-to-ground faults for grounded neutral and ungrounded neutral pro­
viding the system is grounded elsewhere. However, phase-to-phase 
faults will not operate the relay and separate phase relays are re­
quired in this scheme. Figure 3.2(b) illustrates a similar protective 
scheme for delta connected generators. It will protect against phase- 
to-phase faults and phase-to-ground faults if the system is grounded 
elsewhere. In the instances where two sets of current transformers 
are not economically justifiable, a flux balancing differential scheme 
provides a substitute. Figure 3.2(c) shows an example of this scheme. 
This scheme requires that attention be given to the machine primary 
terminal connections since the generator protection zone will vary in 
accordance with the physical location of the current transformers.
(B) Stator Ground-Fault Protection (Device No. 51GN or 64GN)
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The method of grounding affects the degree of protection afforded 
by differential relays as described in the preceeding paragraph. Con­
sequently, it is general practice to insert a separate ground fault 
relay in the neutral as a part of fault protection. This relay can be 
either a current sensitive type (Device No. 51GN or 50GN) or a voltage 
sensitive type (Device No. 64GN).
Typical applications of the current type ground fault relay are 
in direct-connected systems, that is, a generator connected directly 
to a bus with other circuits. Since a fault on one of these circuits 
might also misoperate the relay, a time delay is usually required to 
coordinate with other overlapping relays. Although this type of relay 
can provide sensitive protection to some extent, it becomes less appli­
cable as the grounding impedance of the generator is increased. This 
is so because the lower the relay pickup, the higher its burden on the 
current transformer and the more difficult it is to discriminate ground 
fault current and the third harmonic current flowing in the neutral. 
This third harmonic current may reach 15% of the maximum generator 
output with solid grounding.
Applications of voltage sensitive type relays for ground fault 
protection can be best illustrated in a unit generator-transformer 
system. The relay used must be insensitive to the third harmonic volt­
age which may normally exist between neutral and ground, and yet still 
respond to the voltage shift of the generator neutral with respect to 
ground which accompanies a fault. Since the power transformer and the 
station service transformers are all connected in delta on the generator 
side, coordination with other protection is virtually unnecessary and
the ground fault relay used can be very sensitive. However, some time 
delay in relay operation is usually provided to prevent tripping on 
system transient disturbances or faults in the potential transformers, 
if used. The general practice is to use the relay to trip the generator 
main circuit breaker and shut down the machine.
A ground fault relay is also economically justifiable in an un­
grounded generator. Though no damage is likely to occur from a single 
ground, a second ground will result in phase-to-phase short circuit 
and requires a service interruption. The relay commonly used for such 
detection is a voltage-sensitive relay connected across the secondary 
of a potential transformer (bank) or an indicating voltmeter. The re­
lay is generally used to initiate an alarm.
3.4 Abnormal Operation Protection
A generator in abnormal operation modes may be subjected to severe 
damage. The most frequent abnormal operation conditions include loss 
of excitation, motoring, negative sequence current, uncleared system 
fault, overloading, overtemperature, overvoltage, overspeed, over and 
under frequency, grounded rotor and so on. In addition to the potential 
damage to the generator, some of these conditions may also be disastrous 
to the system operation depending upon the relative size of the genera­
tor. In this section, protection schemes for these conditions will be 
discussed.
(A) Loss of Excitation (Device No. 40)
Partial or complete loss of excitation on a synchronous generator 
will result in a drop of terminal voltage, causing it to draw reactive 
power from the system. If the system is large enough to supply the
deficiency in excitation through the armature, the machine will operate 
as an induction generator, running at 1 to 3 percent above the synchro­
nous speed. Since synchrous generators are not designed for asynchro­
nous operation, the machine output will oscillate as the rotor rotates 
in an attempt to lock into synchronism and severely damage the rotor, 
especially a non-salient one, by overheating. Furthermore, an excessive 
voltage drop represents a potential disaster. Consequently, it is a 
safety practice that loss of excitation protection should be provided 
for all synchronous generators. The decision remains as to whether the 
relay should trip the unit or sound an alarm. From the standpoint of 
generator protection, most modern generators can run two or three min­
utes at full load with zero excitation without endangering the genera­
tor. Consequently, the generator can stand a delay in tripping. From 
the standpoint of protecting the system against instability, the system 
cannot withstand the large reactive power displacement following loss 
of excitation accident. Therefore, it is a proper approach to plan 
to trip the generator on loss of excitation unless there is definite 
justification that the accident will not result in a major system 
disturbance.
Two types of relays are available for use as loss of excitation 
protection [1]. The simplest type is an undercurrent relay connected 
in series with the field circuit. However, this type of relay would 
not necessarily detect loss of excitation resulting from short circuit 
in the field winding. Where more complete protection is required, an 
impedance relay should be used. The basic element of loss of excitation 
relays is an impedance unit. When a generator loses excitation, the
impedance seen by the relay looking into it will depend upon the 
machine characteristics, the load flow to the loss of excitation, and 
the type of excitation failure. Therefore, it may be necessary to use 
a timing unit, directional unit, undervoltage relay and others to pre­
vent possible malfunctions of the impedance unit. As an example, Fig­
ure 3.3(a) illustrates application of an offset mho distance relay 
for a unit system protection [15]. Figure 3.3(b) shows system behav­
ior under stable swings resulting from system disturbance. It is 
obvious from the R-X diagram that a time delay unit or another mho 
relay is required to prevent undesired tripping. This requirement 
depends upon the possible modes of generator operation, generator 
characteristics and the particular system concerned. Each application 
shall be individually evaluated and the generator manufacturer shall 
be consulted for protection requirements and relay settings.
An important consideration in the application of loss of excitation 
relays relates to the potential transformer secondary practice. In 
general, the potential transformers that provide potential to the relay 
will have other burdens connected between phases and possibly between 
phase and neutral. If a secondary fuse or circuit breaker on one phase 
is open, the potential on that phase will not necessarily go to zero. 
It will generally assume some potential depending on the impedance of 
the total burdens connected between that phase and the other phase and 
ground. Thus, when potential transformer secondary fuses are used, it 
is recommended that the relay be fused separately from all other 
devices. The blowing of a potential transformer primary fuse, when 
used, presents a similar problem that cannot generally be solved as
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easily as the secondary fuse situation. In order to prevent malfunc­
tion on a blown primary fuse, a voltage balance relay (Device No. 60) 
can be used to supervise the loss-of-excitation relay tripping contacts.
The basic considerations above apply to all types of prime movers. 
However, special caution must be observed in the case of hydro-genera­
tors and under-excited synchronous condensers. Hydroelectric generators 
may be operated severely underexcited during light load to compensate 
for system distributed capacitance. Therefore, the operating condition 
during a light load period can approach the loss of excitation condition 
in terms of impedance seen by the relay and may result in undesired 
tripping.
(B) Motoring Protection (Device No. 32)
If the turbine throttle or stop valves are closed while the genera­
tor remains connected to the system, the generator will run as a motor, 
receiving sufficient power from the system to supply friction and wind­
age losses in the unit. The approximate power required to motor a gen­
erator depends upon the individual design of the generator. Listed 
below is the approximate power expressed as a percentage of nameplate 
rating from General Electric and Westinghouse catalogs.
General Electric Westinghouse
Condensing Steam Turbine 0.5 - 1.0% 3%
Noncondensing Steam Turbine 1 - 4 %  >3%
Hydraulic Turbine 2 - 100% 0.2 - >2Z
Gas Turbine •  ---------------- 50%
Single-shaft Gas Turbine 100% ---
Double-shaft Gas Turbine 10 - 15% ---
Diesel Engine - 2 Cycle 25% 25%
Diesel Engine - 4 Cycle 15% ---
It should be noted that motoring will not endanger the generator
itself at all. In fact, generator motoring protection is intended for
the prime movers and the system as backup protection, rather than for 
the generator. For example, steam turbines will be overheated because 
of the lack of adequate steam flow to cool the blades and shroud, and 
generally will be protected by steam temperature devices. Similarly, 
hydraulic flow indicators will protect against blade cavitation on low 
water flow.
There are considerable variations in industry in the methods for 
protecting against damage from motoring conditions. There is so much 
divergence in practice that it is difficult to say which one is the most 
widely accepted. Since safe motoring times will usually be in the order 
of one minute or less, some companies, particularly in older or smaller 
stations, depend upon operators to notice the condition and initiate 
corrective measures. Other companies use directional power relays 
(Device No. 32) to detect the condition, to initiate an alarm, or to 
trip the generator main circuit breaker.
Regardless of these variations, a trend is developing to use an 
electrical reverse power relay to trip the unit from the system when 
motoring because of the increasing complexity of modern stations and the 
huge investment involved in larger generators. This is the protective 
scheme strongly recommended because it affords maximum protection to the 
prime mover. In case of diesel-engine generating units, reverse power 
relaying is imperative because of inherent danger of explosion and fire 
from unburned fuel.
(C) Unbalanced Current Protection: Negative Sequence Current
(Device No. 46)
Negative sequence currents, inherent in unbalanced phase currents
due to external phase faults or unbalanced loads, will induce twice- 
rated frequency rotor currents. These currents tend to flow in the 
rotor iron, slot wedges, and retaining rings, resulting in rotor heat­
ing. The capability of machines to withstand this heating can be best 
expressed as a function of the negative sequence current and of time 
[16]. This heating will not be excessive if the following condition 
is satisfied:
a 2)2t < k,
where l£ is the negative sequence current in p.u. stator current, 
t is the duration of the fault in seconds, and 
k is a constant for the machine.
Typical k values are tabulated below for design reference:
Type of Machine k
Indirectly cooled Turbine Generators 30
Conductor-cooled Turbine Generators (up to 800 MVA) 10
Conductor-cooled Turbine Generators (800 MVA to 1600 MVA) 5
Hydraulic Turbine Generators 40
Engine Driven Generators 40
Synchronous Condensers 30
Frequency Changer Sets 30
Since the capability of machines to withstand unbalanced faults 
can be expressed as a function of (I2 ) t, the phase-balance current 
relay selected for generator protection shall have a time characteristic 
matching the (I2 ) t characteristics of the machine.
There has been controversy on whether or not negative-sequence 
relaying is a primary protection. A fault which results in excessive
negative-sequence heating will usually be detected by one of the first- 
line relays, either on the generator or on the system. In this respect, 
negative-sequence relaying may be regarded as backup relaying. On the 
other hand, none of the other relays are designed to protect expressly 
against this condition, nor can the negative-sequence relay serve as 
backup for balanced faults. Then, it seems proper to consider it as 
primary protection. Regardless of the above arguments and in view of 
possible major damage from overheating, it is recommended practice 
that all major generators be equipped with negative-sequence relays 
and that the relay trip the generator instead of initiating an alarm.
In case the negative-sequence relaying is intended as backup, it 
is essential that the relay time characteristic be coordinated with 
other relays in the system. If required, additional time delay units 
should be used to prevent undesired tripping due to system temporary 
disturbances. In the application of this relay, it is also important 
to check current transformer performance to assure that a false unbal­
anced current caused by current transformer errors will not trip the 
unit.
(D) System Fault Backup Protection (Device No. 51^/21)
Generator backup relaying is applied to protect either the machine 
itself or the external system in the event of failure of primary pro­
tection on the machine or system. The application and setting deter­
mination of backup relays are usually more difficult than for first-line 
relays. Not only is it necessary to foresee the system emergency con­
ditions asking for the relay to operate, it is further necessary to 
know the operation of other protective devices under these conditions.
Because the application of backup relays depends so directly upon sys­
tem conditions, no specific protective scheme can be recommended which 
will be suitable for all cases. However, it is general practice that 
some form of backup relaying be provided to open the generator main 
circuit breaker in case of system uncleared faults.
Following are two schemes which can satisfy requirements of most 
generator protection. One scheme uses three voltage sensitive time 
overcurrent relays, the other uses three single phase distance relays 
in conjunction with a timer. The choice between these two schemes is 
mainly governed by the type of system protective relaying with which 
these relays are to be selective. In general, the former scheme shall 
be used when the generator is directly connected to a bus at generator 
voltage, because such relaying is most selective with inverse time 
overcurrent characteristics generally used for lines connected to such 
a bus. The latter scheme is used with unit generator-transformer 
arrangement because the relay is most selective with distance or pilot 
wire relaying generally used for high-tension lines. In both schemes, 
the current source should be current transformers at the neutral ends 
of the generator windings if such CT’s are available. With such con­
nection, the relays will provide generator fault backup protection as 
well as system fault backup protection even if the generator main cir­
cuit breaker is open or there are no other generation sources in the 
system. If the neutral CT’s are not available, then line-side CT’s 
should be used. With such connection, the relays will backup the 
system and generator only when the generator main breaker is closed 
and there are no other sources of generation in the system. One point
which deserves special caution in the design of external fault backup 
protection is that the phase-to-phase voltage shall be obtained from 
generator potential transformers. Loss of potential to the relays due 
to fuse blowing may cause misoperation of the relays. This can be re­
solved by the use of voltage balance relays (Device No. 60).
For protection of uncleared ground faults in the station bus, and 
the system, an inverse time overcurrent relay shall be used to provide 
backup protection. For directly connected machines, this backup pro­
tection can be obtained by connecting the relay across an additional 
CT on the neutral of the machine. For unit connected machines, a third 
harmonic restraint overcurrent relay in the generator neutral can de­
tect ground faults only up to and within unit transformer low voltage 
windings. In order to obtain backup protection for uncleared faults 
on high voltage buses, transformer windings, or the system, another 
ground fault relay fed from a CT in the transformer high voltage neutral 
should be used.
In any scheme, backup protective relays should be arranged to trip 
the main circuit breaker, the field breaker and also shut down the 
prime mover.
(E) Overload and Thermal Protection
For most synchronous generators, overload protection is commonly 
supplied by temperature measuring elements embedded in the stator wind­
ings which will initiate an alarm. Thus, the condition can be corrected 
either by reducing the load, or by increasing any cooling means. Simi­
larly, overheating of bearings (Device No. 38) shall also be alarmed by 
the same means. However, it is not general practice to provide relaying
against rotor overheating since this heating is not measured directly. 
Usually a negative-sequence current relay is accepted as a substitute 
to indicate rotor heating.
(F) Voltage Relaying (Device No. 27, 59, or 60)
Voltage relays can be used for protection against alternating cur­
rent over or under voltage, for permissive control or tripping of other 
devices, and for ground fault detection on equipments and feeders as 
discussed in the preceeding paragraphs.
Overvoltage relaying is recommended for prime mover generator in­
stallations, especially for hydro-electric generators, which may be sub­
jected to overspeed and consequent overvoltage upon loss of load. In 
this application, the relay shall be arranged to open the generator and 
field circuit breakers. It may also be used as backup relaying for a 
voltage regulator and for its potential transformer in any installation 
since most overvoltage, that is overexcitation, cases are caused by 
leaving the voltage regulator on while generator speed is slowing down. 
In this application, the relay will either sound an alarm or initiate 
other equipment to reduce the generator excitation.
It is recommended practice to provide undervoltage relaying for 
synchronous converters and all alternating current motors. The relay 
will disconnect the armature circuit from the system upon loss of volt­
age or upon the occurrence of low voltage. Usually this protection 
should function with time delay dropout to prevent shutdown on transient 
voltage dips.
Voltage balance relaying is used to block relays or other devices 
that will operate incorrectly when a potential transformer fuse blows.
Some of these relays and devices are voltage restraint overcurrent re­
lays, voltage controlled overcurrent relays, loss of excitation relays, 
synchronizing relays, automatic voltage regulators and some impedance 
relays. In this application, the voltage balance relay shall initiate 
an alarm as well as block the misoperation of other devices.
Another typical application of voltage relaying is capacitor 
switching control and automatic transfer of power supplies to critical 
circuits. In cogeneration applications, an induction generator may be 
operated in parallel with a capacitor bank. Overvoltage relaying is 
recommended for the capacitor protection. This application will be 
discussed in more detail later.
(G) Overspeed and Over Frequency Relaying (Device Ho. 81)
Since most modern generators are equipped with some type of mechan­
ical or electromagnetic speed regulator, overspeed protection is not 
always necessary. In the absence of a mechanical overspeed protection, 
frequency relaying can be used to detect an over speed condition indi­
rectly. However, protection by mechanical devices is preferable because 
operation is more direct and does not depend on the presence of alter­
nating current voltage.
(H) Rotor Ground Detection (Device No. 64F)
Although modern generator excitation systems are almost invariably 
operated ungrounded so that an accidental ground will not cause major 
damage, some means of continuous supervision of the field circuit to 
detect the first ground is generally applied. The detector will be 
used to initiate an alarm rather than trip the generator.
(I) Synchronism-Check and Synchronizing Relays [1]
The synchronism-check relay is used to verify when two alternating 
current circuits are within the desired limits of frequency and voltage 
phase angle to manually switch them to operate in parallel. These re­
lays can also be employed on switching applications on systems known 
to be normally paralleled at some other location. In this case, they 
are only checking these two sources to insure that they have not become 
electrically separated or displaced by an unacceptable phase angle.
The synchronizing relay, on the other hand, monitors two separate 
systems that are to be paralleled and automatically initiates a switch­
ing action when the beat frequency, voltage deviation and phase angle 
difference are within the acceptable limits.
(J) Out-of-Step Protection [16]
As generator per-unit reactances have steadily increased over the 
years, and inertia constants have decreased with increased machine 
ratings, these conditions intensify the need for out-of-step detection 
as part of generator relaying complement. Ideally, generator out-of- 
step relaying should be designed to open circuit breakers at a few pre­
determined locations so that generation and load in each subsystem are 
reasonably balanced.
The basic element of an out-of-step relay is an impedance unit in 
conjunction with a timer, a directional unit, or another impedance 
unit. The relay differs from the loss-of-excitation relay in that it 
is usually equipped with undervoltage supervision.
3.4 Protection of Synchronous Generators
All power systems, whether utility, industrial, commercial, or
residential, have a common purpose of providing electric energy to the 
utilization equipment as safely and reliably as is economically feasible. 
At present, synchronous generators play a core role in supplying elec­
tric energy in all these systems. This section will cover the minimum 
protective features for synchronous generators.
In industrial and commercial power systems, local generators are 
quite often included to either supply all or part of the total load or 
provide emergency power in the event of a failure of the normal source 
of energy. Generators used to supply all or part of the required sys­
tem energy are operated almost continuously. They are usually turbine 
generators. Generation is usually at the system’s higher voltage 
level. Those used to supply emergency power are normally shut down 
and are briefly operated when the normal power source fails or during 
maintenance, testing and inspection. They are usually diesel engine 
or gas turbine driven. Generation is usually at the voltage level of 
the largest load to be served. Generally, generators for industrial 
and commercial power systems are connected directly to the systems. 
Figure 3.4 shows the recommended protection for generators that are 
direct-connected to the system [4]. This figure is self-explanatory 
except 87G Relay. This relay is used to supplement the differential 
relay (87) where an impedance is applied to limit the maximum ground- 
fault current to less than the generator full load current. A current- 
polarized directional relay may be used for this application, its op­
erating coil being connected to the differential circuit and its polar­
izing coil from a neutral current transformer.
Before leaving this topic, it is proper to clarify the following
RECOMMENDED PROTECTION FOR SYNCHRONOUS 
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two points. First, where suitable current transformers are available, 
the flux balancing differential scheme shown in Figure 3.2(c) may be 
used. The relay for Device 87 should be of instantaneous type in this 
instance. In general, the sensitivity of this scheme should be selected 
as such not to require the use of 87G. Second, it is necessary that 
the static exciter, if energized from the stator circuit of the genera­
tor, shall include some means of maintaining excitation should the 
stator become short circuited. This is so because this condition may 
result in insufficient flow of fault current to ensure proper relay 
operation.
Contrasted with the direct connected system, the unit system is 
commonly used in generating stations. Figure 3.5 shows an overall pro­
tection scheme for a tandem compound unit connected generator. When a 
station service transformer is included in the zone of the generator 
differential protection, it may require that 87G utilize harmonic re­
straint. Generally, the type of generator prime mover will determine 
whether it is necessary to do so. In addition to the differential re­
lay 87G protecting the generator, another percentage differential relay, 
87T should be installed as shown in the figure. This relay serves as 
primary protection for faults in the generator leads and in the trans­
former as well as backup for the generator differential relay 87G. 
Current transformers for this relay should be installed on the bus 
side of the breaker in order to provide overlapping protection between 
the bus and the power transformer. Although the station service trans­
former is included in the power transformer protective zone, the dif­
ferential relay 87T cannot be expected to protect the station service
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Figure 3.5 UNIT GENERATOR TRANSFORMER ARRANGEMENT
transformer due to the relatively small size of this transformer. A 
separate transformer or an overcurrent relay supplied from CT’s in the 
station service transformer HV bushings will probably be required. 
Another overcurrent relay is also recommended to trip the station ser­
vice LV circuit breaker only as a backup for the circuits on the sta­
tion service bus.
Figure 3.6 illustrates an overall protection scheme for a cross­
compound unit connected generator. It is self-explanatory except the 
following point. On cross-compound units, field is usually applied 
while the set is on turning gear. Application of field to such machines 
normally excites the generator step-up transformer as well as the gen­
erator so that protection is required for all of the unit system. The 
filter circuit of some harmonic-restraint relays may cause failure to 
operate if a fault occurs before the machine is up to synchronous 
speed. Since relay designs vary, the relay performance at reduced fre­
quency should be checked.
3.5 Protection of Induction Generators
Recently, the cogeneration concept has gained the intense interest 
of electric utilities, industry, government, and most facilities with 
substantial energy requirements because of the increasing cost of fuel. 
Cogeneration is defined as the production of electric power and some 
other form of useful energy such as heat or process steam in the same 
or adjoining facilities.
Either the induction generator or the synchronous generator can be 
used in cogeneration applications. The induction generator has the ad­
vantage of simplicity in design and operation. The construction is
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that of a squirrel cage induction motor. The field windings, provisions 
for rotating excitation supply to the field or separate field excitation 
equipment and slip rings as well as voltage regulation equipment are not 
required, but would be for a synchronous generator. The induction gen­
erator always assumes the same output voltage and frequency as that of 
the external system, so synchronizing equipment is not necessary. The 
protective relaying is essentially the same as that which would be pro­
vided for an induction motor of comparable size. However, the induction 
generator cannot be operated as an independent source when the external 
source is down because of its need for an external magnetizing power 
supply. Consequently, in an industrial plant where an uninterrupted 
supply is vital, the synchronous generator should be used.
Figure 3.7 illustrates a protection scheme for an induction gen­
erator. Unlike the protection scheme for a synchronous generator, the 
loss-of-excitation relaying is not required. Also, the flux self- 
balancing differential scheme is generally used for induction generator 
protection. The differential relay used can be the inverse-time over­
current type, not the percentage type. The ground fault protection re­
lay (50G) is generally fed from the residual of the primary side current 
transformers. Where a shunt capacitor bank is used to improve the over­
all power factor, the voltage relaying is required to protect the gen­
erator against over and under voltage. There are considerable varia­
tions in the industry in the applications of the anti-motoring protec­
tion to the induction generator. Where the machine is designed to 
operate both as a generator and a motor, the relay should be arranged 
to initiate an alarm but not to trip the unit circuit breaker. Where
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Figure 3.7 PROTECTION OF AN INDUCTION GENERATOR
the machine is designated to operate only as a generator, the relay 
should trip the unit circuit breaker and shut down the generator. In 
some instances, reverse power relaying is provided to prevent power 
flow into the utility's incoming line. The relay for this purpose is 
usually arranged to trip the main incoming breaker. However, this 
type of application should be carefully studied for the particular 
installation since the tripping of incoming main breaker might be far 
more harmful than a reverse power flow to the utility.
CHAPTER 4 
TRANSFORMER PROTECTION
At first thought, a power transformer might seem to be a highly 
reliable device, and this is correct as far as the mean failure rate 
is concerned. Yet, if we consider the mean down time per transformer- 
year, it is obvious that transformer protection is no less important 
than generator protection [4]. Contrasted with the several types of 
abnormal operation to which generators may be subjected, a transformer 
presents a much more limited protective problem.
A transformer may be subjected to short circuit, open circuit, and 
overload. Transformer failures can be grouped in the descending order 
of occurrence as follows [17]:
(1) Winding failures are the most frequent. Reasons for this in­
clude insulation failure and voltage surge. Voltage surge resulting 
from lightning and switching transients should be protected by voltage 
surge protective devices such as rod gaps and arresters. Two principal 
causes of insulation failure are overheating and overvoltage. Over­
heating because of overloading or failure of the cooling system will 
deteriorate the insulation. Insulation thus weakened may fail when it 
is stressed by only a moderate overvoltage. Insulation may also fail 
when a transformer is returned to service without first making sure 
that the insulation is free from moisture. Ground faults in ungrounded 
systems and sudden load shedding can subject transformer windings to 
severe voltage stress which may also cause winding failure.
(2) Tap changer and terminal board failures are attributed to 
improper design, assembly, handling in transportation, or mechanical
contact problems.
(3) Bushing failures due to aging, contamination, cracking, etc.
(4) Core failures involving clamping brackets or short circuited 
laminations.
(5) Miscellaneous failures including current transformer failures, 
liquid leakage, etc.
Transformer protection is generally achieved by current sensing 
devices, mechanical sensing devices, or more frequently combinations 
of the two. Current sensing devices including fuses, overcurrent 
relays, differential relays and pressure relays are used to protect 
transformers against short circuit. Mechanical sensing devices, in­
cluding thermal relays, gas relays, etc., are designed to detect ab­
normal operating conditions.
Compared with other equipments in power systems, power transformer 
protection is different from others in the following aspects:
(1) Different voltage levels, including taps. This implies dif­
ferent primary current ratings in the connecting circuits, and conse­
quently different current transformer types, ratios, characteristics 
with possible mismatch of ratios, etc. This might create problems in 
relaying.
(2) Magnetizing inrush current which appears to differential re­
lays as an internal fault.
(3) Phase shift between the primary and the secondary.
Since published application guides covering transformers are few in 
number [17], protective relaying engineers must rely on their sound 
engineering judgment to achieve an adequate or optimal protection
system. This chapter will outline some important points in designing 
power transformer protection systems. Special emphasis is put on power 
transformer relaying. Since magnetizing inrush has definite impact on 
relay function, it will also be briefly covered.
4.1 Philosophy of Power Transformer Protection
Among the current sensing devices for small transformer protection, 
fuses are widely used for this purpose. Although fuses have certain 
limitations, they have the merits of being economical, simple to main­
tain, and generally failsafe. This is true for many transformer sizes; 
however, transformers exceeding 2 MVA in rating are usually provided 
with more sensitive protection. Fuses can be reliably used to protect 
against external short circuit currents under most conditions, but can­
not be relied upon to protect the transformer from internal faults or 
long time overload.
If considering fusing of a transformer, the following factors shall 
be taken into consideration in the selection of fuse links.
(1) Time current curves published by manufacturers should be cor­
rected for ambient temperature conditions and prefault load currents.
(2) Maximum permissible load currents and the transformer heating 
curve recommended by standards.
(3) Transformer connections.
(4) Available primary system fault current . and the transformer 
impedances.
(5) Coordination with low-side protection equipment.
(6 ) Maximum allowable fault time on the low-side bus conductors.
(7) Maximum degree of sensitivity for protection from high imped­
ance faults.
Where more sensitive protection is required, it can be achieved by 
proper selection and combination of different types of relaying. Power 
transformer relaying in general includes abnormal operation sensing de­
vices to protect the transformer and fault detecting devices to protect 
the system and limit damage in event of a fault. Abnormal operation 
sensing devices include thermal relays, pressure relief devices, gas 
detector, liquid level indicator, combustible gas relay, etc. Fault 
detecting devices include sudden pressure relays, overcurrent relays, 
differential relays and system backup relays. Again, differential re­
laying is the principal form of transformer protection. However, this 
type of protection cannot be as sensitive as that of generator protec­
tion due to the factors stated above although it does protect turn-to- 
turn and phaseto-ground faults. Pressure sensitive relays are generally 
used to detect either the rate of rise of gas pressure (sudden pressure), 
a slow accumulation of gas (gas detector), or more commonly a combina­
tion of both. Such relays are supplemental to differential and ground 
fault relaying for fault protection, and to overload relaying for ab­
normal operation protection. System backup protection and other forms 
of abnormal operation protection are sometimes used depending upon the 
requirements of the individual system design. In most cases, fault cur­
rent sensing devices and combustible gas relays should be arranged to 
trip the transformer; on the other hand, abnormal operation relaying 
should be arranged either to initiate an alarm only or automatically 
shed parts of transformer loads.
4.2 Effects of Magnetizing Inrush on Differential Protection
The small component of current consumed in the power transformer
for producing the necessary flux is negligible for differential relaying 
application in steadystate. This is true over the full range of trans­
former operation and even for several times full load current when a 
short circuit first occurs, because the unbalance due to the magnetizing 
current is small compared with the full load current and far below the 
relay pickup.
However, when a transformer is first connected to a power source 
after the transformer has been completely deenergized, there is a mag­
netizing inrush from 8 to 30 times that of full load current [16]. 
There are two other types of inrush, that is, recovery inrush and sym­
pathetic inrush, but of lesser magnitude. There are several conditions 
that cause particularly severe magnetizing inrush phenomena. One in­
volves the energizing of a transformer at a station at which at least 
one other transformer on the same bus is already energized. The inrush 
involves the already energized transformer as well as the one being 
energized, and the inrush transient is of particularly long duration. 
It is important to realize that the inrush into the transformer being 
energized occurs during the opposite half-cycle to that of the already 
energized transformer. Thus, the net inrush into all transformers on 
the same bus may be nearly a sine wave of fundamental frequency. This 
phenomenon makes necessary a separate harmonic suppression relay unit 
for each bank. Another inrush phenomenon involves the energizing of a 
transformer by means of an air switch. Arcing of the switch can re­
sult in successive half cycles of arc of the same polarity. Thus, if 
the first half cycle results in substantial residual magnetism in the 
transformer core, succeeding half cycles can cause a cumulative increase
in residual magnetism, each time resulting in a more severe inrush.
Important differences between a magnetizing inrush current and a 
short circuit current are:
(1) A magnetizing inrush current has a dominant harmonic component 
generally either the second or the third order which is generally not 
present in a short circuit current.
(2) Accompanying a short circuit current, there is a voltage dip 
which is not present in a magnetizing inrush current.
To differential relays, the inrush current looks like an internal 
fault. Some methods commonly used to distinguish magnetizing inrush 
from fault include:
(1) Reduced sensitivity of percentage differential relays to the 
inrush current, that is, either a higher pickup setting or an intended 
time delay in operation.
(2) Restraints by harmonic components, especially the second order, 
of inrush current.
(3) Desensitization of the differential relays during energization.
In applying these methods, it is important that precaution shall
be observed for the following considerations:
(1) While it is simple to prevent misoperation of a differential 
relay during inrush, care shall be taken that means should not delay 
tripping if a short circuit should occur during this period.
(2) When two or more transformers are connected to a common bus 
and switched separately, harmonic ■components generally existing in. 
inrush currents may not be available for preventing mistripping depend­
ing upon the specific system configuration under consideration. This
is so because a transformer suddenly energized tends to take the har­
monic components of the inrush current from the parallel banks while 
the fundamental component comes from the system [17].
(3) In the event of load injection, the transformer may be subject 
to substantial overvoltage and saturation. If saturation occurs, sub­
stantial exciting current will flow. In this case there are principally 
odd harmonics, particularly the third order. This may misoperate sec­
ond-order harmonics constraint differential relays [17].
4.3 Fault Protection
Transformer fault protection should function to detect any faults 
either inside the transformer or outside in the terminal leads but with­
in the transformer zone. It generally includes differential protection, 
ground fault protection, and sudden pressure relaying.
4.3.1 Differential Protection (Device No. 87)
(1) Types of differential relays:
ANSI Standard C37.91 [17] lists four general classes of transformer 
differential relays as follows:
(1) Differentially connected time-overcurrent relays
(2) Percentage differential relays
(3) Harmonic restraint percentage differential relays
(4) Desensitized percentage differential relays.
Among these, time-overcurrent relays connected in differential 
scheme are seldom used in transformer protection due to their suscep­
tibility to misoperation from the magnetizing inrush.
The transformer percentage differential relay differs from that 
for generator protection in having higher percentage, that is, larger
characteristic slope so that it has reduced sensitivity to the inrush 
current. The required percentage may vary between 15% and 50% depending 
on the type of the transformer protected and the system configuration. 
Generally speaking, 15% slope is for standard transformers; 25% to 50% 
for load tap-changing transformers, depending upon the range of tapping; 
40% for special application [4]. Drawbacks of its application are:
(a) Its setting should be above the maximum possible inrush cur­
rent. Since most pickups of differential relays on the market cannot 
be set in the field, replacement may be required as the system expands.
(b) Higher percentage means reduced sensitivity not only to inrush 
currents but also to fault currents.
This type of relay is particularly applicable to power transformers of 
moderate sizes located at some distance from the major source of gen­
eration [17].
The harmonic restraint relay makes use of harmonics, particularly 
the second order, present in the inrush current to discriminate mag­
netizing inrush from short circuit. It functions either to block false 
tripping or increase the pickup during the inrush period. Consequently, 
a lower normal pickup setting and a faster operation is possible without 
risk of false tripping. Unfortunately, there are still some problems 
as follows:
(a) During inrush, it will either not trip or delay tripping if 
a short circuit should occur.
(b) Sufficient harmonics may exist in high internal fault currents 
or in the system to inhibit relay operation.
(c) In the event of load rejection, it may respond to overvoltage
magnetizing inrush.
The relay is most suitable for large power transformers located near 
large sources of generation where either severe inrush is highly likely 
or recovery and sympathetic inrush may create problems.
To overcome the inrush problem, the desensitized percentage differ­
ential relay utilizes the fact that a voltage dip always accompanies a 
short circuit. An undervoltage relay is used to control the desensi­
tizing circuit of the differential relay. Under short circuit condi­
tions, the undervoltage relay will remove the desensitizing circuit 
from the differential relay. Consequently, it also provides protection 
against short circuits happening during the inrush period.
(2) General Guidelines for Power Transformer Differential Relaying 
[16] As stated in prior sections, transformer protection design heavily 
relies upon engineeering experience and sound judgment. The following 
guidelines are designed to assist in selecting and applying differential 
relays for power transformer protection. These guidelines do not neces­
sarily apply to special-purpose transformers such as those for power 
rectifiers, converters, inverters and induction furnaces
(a) There is no clear-cut answer to the questions of where a 
differential relay should be used, and which type should be selected if 
a differential relay is required. As a general rule, however, it is 
general practice to use percentage differential relays for all trans­
former banks rated 1 MVA and above and with 2400 V and above secondary 
voltage [4]. Percentage differential relaying is also recommended for 
transformer banks rated below 1 MVA that operate in parallel with 
differentially protected banks and have circuit breakers for all
parallel-connected windings. This is so because it may prove just as 
damaging to the service as a similar fault occurring in a large bank 
if a fault occurring in a small parallel-operated bank is not promptly 
removed. For transformers from 1 MVA to 2 MVA and below 15 KV, desen­
sitized percentage differential relays are recommended. For all trans­
formers rated 2 MVA and above, or having windings rated 15 KV and high­
er, high-speed harmonic restraint percentage differential relays are 
recommended.
(b) Regarding the proper type of current transformers for differ­
ential relaying, it is general practice that bushing-type current 
transformers are used on the high tension side and are balanced either 
against other bushing type current transformers on the low tension side 
or against instrument type current transformers. Unfortunately, no 
general answer can be given to this question, but the procedures for 
current transformer accuracy calculation outlined in section 2.4 can 
be used to determine the answer to such a question.
In order that the relay will get as much current as possible, and 
hence be most certain to operate when transformer short circuits occur, 
the ratios of currrent transformers used should be chosen so that they 
will supply the relay with current approximately equal to its tap rat­
ing at maximum load. In case the multi-ratio current transformer is 
used, a tap which will give approximately 5 amperes at maximum load 
shall be used. This arrangement will generally provide good sensitivity 
without introducing thermal problems in the current transformer, the 
leads, or the relay itself.
In general, the use of low ratio bushing type current transformers
should be avoided. Bushing type current transformers used for differ­
ential protection should have a minimum of 40 turns [17]. This is be­
cause these transformers show a marked departure from the turn ratio 
over the range from very low current to that limited by the power trans­
former on through faults, especially at 345 KV and higher.
For power transformers having three or more windings, all windings 
should be treated as having the same capacity as the KVA rating of the 
highest rated winding when determining the proper current transformer 
rating to use. This is because it is the voltage ratio, not the indi­
vidual KVA 'rating of each winding which determines the current that 
will flow to an external fault. For tap changers, it is customary to 
choose current transformer ratios and relay adjustments on the basis of 
using a transformer tap at the middle of its range. Thus, with a plus 
or minus 10% range, the minimum, current transformer unbalance will be 
plus or minus 10%.
In applications where a power transformer is connected to the 
rest of the system through two breakers, for example a ring bus or 
breaker-and-a-half arrangements, the CT ratios must be selected so 
that the secondary windings will not be thermally overloaded on load 
current flowing around the ring in addition to the transformer load 
current.
(c) A useful rule for determining current transformer connections 
in differential protection is as follows: The current transformers in 
the leads to a wye connected winding should be connected in delta; cur­
rent transformers in the leads to a delta connected winding should be 
connected in wye. The connections should be so arranged as to block
the zero sequence current from the differential circuit on external 
ground faults, and to compensate for the 30° phase shift introduced by 
the wye-delta connected power transformer bank.
For current transformer connections in a power transformer having 
three or more windings, consider any two windings first and connect the 
current transformers for those two windings as if they were the only 
windings; then consider a pair consisting of one of those windings and 
another, and so on till finishing all the connections.
Before leaving this topic, it is well to observe precaution never 
to ground interconnected current transformers such as those used for 
differential protection, at different points on a ground bus or to two 
different station grounds. A difference of potential betwen two points 
may occur and cause misoperation of the relay when ground current flows.
(d) Differential relays should be connected to receive "in" and 
"out" currents that are in phase for a balanced load condition. Where 
there are more than two windings, all combinations must be considered, 
two at a time.
(e) After the current transformer ratios have been determined, 
the relay taps should be so selected that the relay ratio is as close 
as possible to the ratio of the secondary current in the current trans­
formers. Then the continuous rating of relay windings should be checked 
for compatibility with the power transformer load. If the currents 
supplied by the current transformers exceed the relay continuous rating, 
a higher current transformer ratio or relay tap should be used. How*- 
ever, it is desirable to increase CT ratio in preference to the relay 
tap. Since the relay burden is likely to be relatively small compared
to the lead burden; increasing the CT ratio tends to improve the rela­
tive performance of the CT's as a result of reducing the maximum sec­
ondary fault current and increasing the accuracy of the CT’s.
(f) The percentage of current mismatch should always be checked 
to ensure that the relay taps selected have an adequate safety margin. 
Percentage mismatch M can be determined as follows [17]:
in which II, Ir are currents supplied by current transformers on low 
and high voltage sides, respectively. Tl , Tr are relay tap settings 
for low and high voltage sides respectively. S is the smaller of 
(IL/IR) or (TL/TR).
For power transformers having three or more windings, all combina­
tions should be calculated, two at a time. It is important that the 
total mismatch should include not only M but also load tap changing 
values (LTC).
(g) To ensure correct operation of the relaying scheme, the cur­
rent transformer ratio error must not exceed a specific limit depending 
upon the specific relay characteristics used. Again, the procedures 
outlined in section 2.4 shall be applied to determine the percentage 
errors of the current transformers. In the next paragraph, an example 
will be used to illustrate checking the current transformer ratio.
(h) The total error of the differential scheme equals M plus LTC 
and CT ratio error. This value should be smaller than the relay slope 
used by a safety margin, usually at least 5%, to ensure correct
operation of the scheme.
(i) It is not desirable to protect two or more power transformers 
connected in parallel with one set of differential protection as pointed 
out in section 4.2
(j) On a wye-delta transformer, which has a grounding transformer 
connected on the delta size, external ground faults on the delta side 
will cause zero sequence currents to flow in the wye connected CTs. 
These currents are not balanced by corresponding currents from the 
delta connected CTs and may cause spurious operation. To eliminate 
this misoperation, a zero sequence current trap can be inserted in 
the wye connected CTs circuit to correct the inbalance.
(3) Checks for Applying Transformer Differential Relays 
The complete procedure for applying transformer differential relays 
is summarized in Figure 4.1 and can be best illustrated by the following 
example.
Considering the protection of a three-winding bank as shown in 
Figure 4.2, a harmonic restraint percentage differential relay with 
the following characteristics have been selected for the protection.
Tap Operating Circuit Restraint Circuit Burden
Setting (A) Burden (VA)____  Burden (VA) Impedance (Ohms)
2.9 3.2 1.3 0 180
3.2 2.7 1 . 2 0 156
3.5 2.4 1 . 1 0 140
3.8 2 . 0 1 . 0 0 1 2 0
4.2 1.9 0.9 0 1 1 2
4.6 1 . 6 0 . 8 0 0'96
5.0 1.5 0.7 0 088
8.7 0.7 0.5 0 048
The relay has a 25% slope and a time current characteristic curve as 
shown in Figure 4.3. The continuous and short time current ratings of
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the relay are 10 A and 220 A for one second, respectively. Further­
more, assume the maximum available fault level for a three phase fault 
is 1.6 GVA. Determine the differential protecting scheme for this 
transformer.
The designing procedure of the scheme is illustrated step by step 
as follows:
(i) Select CT ratio:
ip = k v a / ( y r  v ^ )
= 37,500/( Vi-i)
CT connections
relay current factor ( )
CT ratio IpKj
TRANSFORMER WINDINGS 
110 KV (Y) 44 KV (A) 13.8 KV (Y)
197 A 
delta 
✓3
400/5
492 A 
wye
1
500/5
1,569 A 
delta
J T
3000/5
(ii) Select relay taps: 
Relay current (A) 
tried relay taps (A)
(iii) Check mismatch errors:
Mismatch error between 
110KV & 44 KV
Mismatch error between 
110 KV & 13.8 KV
Mismatch error between 
44 KV & 13.8 KV
4.27
4.2
4.92 
5 .0
4.27 _ 4.2
4.92 5.0'
4.2
5.01 /
3.0 %
4.27 _ 4.6
4.53
4.6 
5.0
2 r w • 3' /o
4.92 _ 5.0
4.53
4.92
4.53
4.53
4.6
5.0' X 1002
4.6 X 1002
0.082
All are less than 5%, therefore, mismatch error is not excessive
(iv) Check relay ratings:
continuous relay ratings (A) 10 10 10
maximum fault current (A) 8.398 20,995 66,941
= 1.6 GVA/( J T  V ^ )
relay fault currents (A) 181 210 193
Select desired operating time according to the system requirement. From 
Figure 4.3, assume the required operating time is less than 3 cycles at 
8 times relay tap value. This means that the current transformers 
should be able to supply the relay with 8 times rated relay tap current 
with an acceptable error. On the other hand, the relay short time cur­
rent rating should be at least greater than the fault current supplied 
by the CTs. Given short time current rating of 220 A for one second, 
the short time rating for 3 cycles can be calculated as following: 
( 2 2 0 ) 2  x  1  =  ( i ) 2
i = 983 A for 3 cycles 
Therefore, both continuous and short time ratings are not exceeded,
(v) Check CT ratio errors:
Assume one way resistance is 0.25 ohms. The internal resistances 
of the CT's are 0.15-ohms for 400/5, 0.12 ohms for 500/5, and 0.09 
ohms for 3000/5. Furthermore, assume that there are no other de­
vices connected to these CT’s. Then the total impedance burden 
on each CT can be easily calculated according to section 2.4. 
The results are:
Impedance burden, Ohms (Z) 1.33 0.49 1.23
8 times relay taps, amps (Ig) 33.6 40.0 36.8
Secondary voltage required (ZIg) 44.7 19.6 45.3
Excitation current from
excitation curve (Ig) 2.5 1.2 2.0
% ratio error (Ig/Ig) 7.4% 3.0% 5.4%
(vi) Check total errors:
Maximum of M + CT ratio errors = 10.4%
(vii) Safety margin available = 25% - 10'.4% = 14.6% minimum.
Therefore, all CT taps selected are satisfactory.
4.3.2 Sudden Pressure and Buchholz Gas Protection (Device No. 63)
Buchholz relays can be applied to conservator type transformers and
sudden pressure relays, to sealed tank construction transformers. These 
relays are more sensitive to light internal faults than the differential 
relay and generally recommended for all units of 5 MVA or more [16]. 
With the application of this type of pressure relay, many transformers 
can be simply protected by a plain differential relay with higher set­
ting instead of harmonic-restraint type. Generally speaking, the relay 
should trip a separate lock-out relay from that tripped by the differen­
tial relay. In case the transformer is protected against short circuits 
by fuses, the relay should initiate an alarm.
4.3.3 Ground Fault Protection (Device No. 50/51N, or 67N)
It is general practice to apply ground overcurrent relays to each
transformer winding which is supplied from a grounded system, to detect 
possible ground faults within that winding.
Where the transformer primary winding is not a zero sequence source 
and a single donut type CT can be fitted around all three phases, a 
sensitive instantaneous ground overcurrent relay should be used. If 
a donut type CT cannot be fitted, an inverse time/instantaneous over­
current relay fed from the residual circuit of the phase CTs should be 
used.
Where a transformer primary winding is a zero sequence source, a 
sensitive instantaneous relay generally cannot be used since it will 
operate for primary system faults. An inverse time/instantaneous
relay can be employed only if it can provide coordination with the sys­
tem protection for both transformer and system faults. If the coordin­
ation required is difficult or even impossible to achieve, a product 
type directional ground overcurrent relay, current or potential polar­
ized, should be used. If the current polarized relay is used, the 
phase and neutral CTs shall be relatively close together. If they are 
remote from each other, such as those in a transformer feeder, the po­
tential polarized directional ground relay can be used. This relay 
should be fed from the phase CTs and polarized from an open delta 
potential transformer.
In general, an inverse time overcurrent relay fed from a CT in the 
grounded neutrals of all secondary windings and grounding transformers 
is used to provide transformer protection as well as system back-up 
protection.
In applying ground fault relays, precaution should be observed that 
only those circuit breakers connected between all ground fault current 
sources and the transformer will be tripped. This should be carefully 
studied and planned for the particular application. If the ground fault 
current can flow in either direction, the directional overcurrent relay 
should be used.
4 .4 Abnormal Operation Protection
Transformer abnormal operation protection is designed to protect 
the transformer against any abnormal operation such as over-temperature, 
uncleared system faults, gas accumulation, and high pressure. It gen­
erally includes over-temperature protection, system backup protection, 
gas sensing and pressure devices. In this section, all mechanical
devices, including gas sensing and pressure devices will not be elab­
orated since their applications are quite straightforward.
4.4.1 Over-Temperature Protection (Device No. 49)
Over-temperature relays, whose operation depends on the temperature
of the transformer windings or the oil, are inherent selective and are 
recommended for all transformers 10 MVA and above [4].
These relays can be depended upon to trip the transformer main cir­
cuit breaker only when it becomes necessary, especially in unattended 
stations. In attended stations, they are generally arranged to initiate 
an alarm when the transformer overheats.
4.4.2 System Backup Protection (Device No. 51, 67, or 21)
A fault external to the transformer zone will result in an overload
which can cause transformer failure if the fault is not cleared promptly. 
The transformer can be isolated from the fault before damage occurs by 
using either phase overcurrent relays or distance relays. As in gener­
ator protection schemes, the choice between these two types of relays 
is mainly determined by the type of system relaying with which the 
transformer relaying should be coordinated. As a rule of thumb, the 
same type of relaying should be used in both relaying systems, if 
possible.
Compared with generator protection, phase overcurrent relaying is 
far more complicated because of the wide range of load current and more 
coordination requirements in transformer protection. Generally speaking, 
system backup overcurrent protection should be fitted to all phases on 
the source side of the transformer. Overcurrent protection fitted to the 
load side of the transformer is considered as protecting the secondary
system. For the transformer protected by separate differential scheme, 
phase overcurrent relaying also backs up the differential protection. 
For the transformer without differential relaying, it is considered as 
main protection for the transformer.
There are two types of overcurrent relays generally used for trans­
former protection. One is the inverse time overcurrent relay. This 
relay should have two elements, that is, instantaneous trip and inverse­
time characteristic. The required degree of inverseness depends upon 
the particular application. To allow transformer overloading when 
necessary, the pickup value of the inverse unit should be set above 
this overload current. Settings of 200% to 300% of the transformer self­
cooled rating are common, although higher values are sometimes used. 
Fast operation of the inverse time unit is usually impossible, since 
this relay must coordinate with all other relays it overreaches. Con­
sequently, the applications of the overcurrent relay is limited by the 
insensitive setting and the delayed operation for coordination. Before 
advancing to the other type of overcurrent backup, it is proper to 
point out an application which requires special caution. Where an over­
current is used to protect a grounding transformer, it should be fed 
from CTs connected in delta to prevent misoperation due to system 
ground faults.
The other type of overcurent relays generally used is the direc­
tional overcurrent relay. This relay provides best protection where 
fault current can flow in either direction. Generally, the relay 
should be connected to operate when the current flow is into the trans­
former. The directional element should be fed from the same CTs as the
overcurrent element and, in addition, a polarizing voltage derived 
from a PT. In the applications of the directional overcurrent relay 
on a transformer primary which is a zero sequence source, it is general 
practice to use an inverse time overcurrent relay, fed from a CT in the 
primary winding neutral, to provide primary system backup protection. 
Of course, the relay should coordinate with other system relays. More 
discussions on the overcurrent backup protection will be covered in 
the next section.
The application of distance relaying on transformer backup protec­
tion is quite similar to that on generator backup protection. The dis­
tance relay used should be of the directional type. It should be con­
nected to operate when the fault current flows toward the protected 
transformer. The setting should reach into, but not beyond, the trans­
former .
4.5 Protection of Power Transformer
Industrial applications of power transformers fall into the follow­
ing four general categories; generator transformers, system intercon­
nection transformers, power utilization transformers, and special pur­
pose transformers such as voltage regulator, phase regulator, and so 
on. In this section, protective relaying for each category, except 
special purpose transformers, will be discussed. Some protection 
schemes are also given to illustrate the considerations covered in the 
first four sections. Since protective relaying design is really an art, 
the schemes given are for illustration only and should not be taken as 
standards. For any particular application, individual engineering study 
is required.
4.5.1 Protection of Generator Transformers
Since transformer protection of a unit connected generator is cov­
ered in section 3.4, no duplication will be given here. A protective 
scheme for a direct connected generator transformer is shown in Figure 
4.4. Generally speaking, the transformer is a step-up transformer 
with its delta winding connected to the generator bus. The secondary 
winding can be either delta or wye connected depending upon the exter­
nal system connection. The ground overcurrent relay (51G) in the 
grounded neutral of the wye winding should be of inverse time type and 
be coordinated with the system ground fault protection for a system 
ground fault. Similarly, the ground fault overcurrent relay (51G) in 
the grounded neutral of the grounding transformer is designed to backup 
generator bus ground fault protection and should be coordinated with 
generator bus ground fault relaying. In this scheme, a zero sequence 
trap is required on the primary side since a grounding transformer is 
shunt across the delta winding.
4.5.2 Protection of System Interconnection Transformers
A system interconnection transformer is used to interconnect two 
systems such as from transmission system to subtransmission system, or 
between two transmission systems of the same voltage, and so on. It is 
normally a wye-wye transformer or an autotransformer with a delta 
tertiary. The power flow can be in either direction. Figure 4.5 
shows a protective scheme for a wye-wye transformer with delta tertiary. 
It is self-explanatory and straightforward except for the following 
considerations.
The tertiary winding is usually of much smaller rating than the
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main windings and overcurrent relays set to protect the main windings 
offer very little protection to the tertiary. If the rating of the 
tertiary winding can be exceeded by the heavy fault current circulating 
in it on any external ground fault, a single inverse time overcurrent 
relay (51) , fed from a current transformer in one leg of the delta 
should be fitted as shown. It is also noticed that two neutral current 
transformers and the current transformer on delta winding provide cur­
rent polarizing sources for directional units, if used in the adjacent 
protection zones.
4.5.3 Protection of Utilization Transformers
Power utilization transformers are used at the point of industrial 
or other power consumption. They are normally step-down transformers 
connected between the high voltage (above 34.5 KV) power source and 
the distribution system or load. The power flow is normally from high 
voltage to low voltage. Since motors represent a typical load which 
requires special considerations in relaying design, they are the only 
load used for the purpose of illustration.
Various types of transformer installations and their protective 
schemes are shown in Figures 4.6 through 4.12, The characteristics of 
the phase overcurrent relays (50/51) should he of the inverse or very 
inverse type such that their settings can be co-ordinated with the sec­
ondary phase overcurrent relays (51), shown in dotted lines on the 
drawings. Along the same reasoning, 51 relays should coordinate with 
the downstream protection devices.■ When the motor is comparable in size 
with transformer rating, it may be difficult to coordinate the 51 relay 
with the motor protection while obtaining fast clearance tines for high
level faults and a low enough current setting to comply with the NEC,, 
provision 340. Where the transformer supplies a single bus, this 
problem can be resolved by using a second set of phase overcurrent re­
lays. Qme set should have a long time inverse characteristic and the 
second set normally has a standard inverse or very inverse characteris­
tic. On the other hand, the motor must be protected! by a differential 
scheme for sensitive fault detection. This arrangement can achieve 
good sensitivity as well as good selectivity, both of which may be 
unobtainable with only one set of overcurrent relays. Where the trans­
former is one of two or more feeding a multi-section bus, a partial 
differential scheme with a second set of phase overcurrent relays can 
provide the solution to the problem stated above.
If the motor on the low voltage bus is synchronous rather than in­
duction type, it will continue to supply current to a fault until the 
motor comes to rest. For this protection, it is necessary to ensure 
that 50/51 relays will not operate for a high voltage system, fault* 
If the misoperation may occur, directional overcurrent relays (67) 
should be used as shown in alternative 1 in Figures 4.6 through 4*12. 
For the same reason, directional overcurrent relays should also* replace 
50/51 relays if the low voltage bus has another infeed and fault cur­
rent can flow through the transformer in either direction.
As shown in the figures, power transformers with a delta primary 
should be fitted with an instantaneous ground fault relay (50GS) sup­
plied from a "donut" type current transformer. If a donut CT is not 
available, a relay with an inverse time/instantaneous characteristic 
(50/51N) supplied from the residual of the phase current transformers
should be used. In case of a wye primary, the transformer contributes 
current to a high voltage system ground fault. Instantaneous ground 
fault relay (50GS) cannot therefore be used. A residual inverse time 
instantaneous overcurrent relay (50/51N) or a directional overcurrent 
relay (67N1) with another ground fault overcurrent relay (51G) should 
be used. The 51G relay should be fed from a transformer neutral cur­
rent transformer and be coordinated with the high voltage system ground 
fault protection.
Power utilization transformers are sometimes provided with circuit 
switchers instead of circuit breakers. In the design of the protection 
scheme, it is necessary to block the circuit switcher from tripping 
when the fault current is above its interrupting capacity. This usually 
requires that the remote source relay operates instantaneously for 
faults above the circuit switcher interrupting capacity.
In designing protective schemes for parallel transformer banks, a 
separate differential scheme for each transformer is recommended. This 
is especially important when the transformers are of different sizes. 
If considering using only one differential relay, extra phase and 
ground overcurrent should be provided for the smaller transformer.
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CHAPTER 5
MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS OF POWER SYSTEM SUPERVISION,
PROTECTION AND CONTROL
One deciding factor in modern electric power system operation is 
service continuity. Service interruption means not only loss of rev­
enue but, more importantly, possible social disasters. Various ap­
proaches for improving service continuity such as more lines, more 
generators, power pooling, etc., are widely used. Among these, a proper 
relaying system is the most important one. A well designed relaying 
scheme should trip all necessary circuits, not more or not less. Con­
sequently, selectivity and sensitivity are two major considerations in 
the design of protective relaying. These two requirements are usually 
not hard to meet in primary protection through proper selection of dif­
ferent types of relays. However, this is not necessarily true for 
backup protection. For example, remote backup protection for a trans­
mission line may trip circuit breakers on both ends and interrupt all 
loads tapped along the line, which may not be necessary. Breaker 
failure relaying is a local backup protection designed to solve this 
problem.
Applications of electronic computers for electric power system 
protection, operation control and supervision are not new at all. 
Electromagnetic protective relays, widely used since sixty years ago, 
are nothing more than analog computers designated for individual speci­
fic function. As an example, an impedance relay is an analog device 
to calculate the driving point impedance and to initiate other devices 
such as circuit breakers, if necessary. Since digital systems have
definite advantages over analog systems, it is a natural trend to 
replace conventional devices by their digital equivalents wherever 
possible. In this chapter, microprocessor applications on SCADA 
(Supervision _Control And .Data Acquisition) systems will be discussed 
in detail.
5 .1 Transmission Substation Configurations
Generally speaking, transmission switchyards can make use of the 
following four arrangements: the single bus, the double bus, the ring 
bus and the breaker-and-a-half arrangements.
The single straight bus configuration is the simplest arrangement 
and is usually applied where circuit outage for equipment maintenance 
is acceptable. In the event that the loss of all circuits due to any 
single bus fault or breaker failure is intolerable, bus sectionalization 
should be provided.
The double bus configuration can provide a higher degree of reli­
ability than the single bus. It permits equipment maintenance without 
circuit outages. Its design consists, essentially, of the compromises 
between cost of transferring circuit protection and cost of service 
interruption. As with the single bus arangement, sectionalization 
may be necessary for the same consideration.
The ring bus and the breaker and a-half configuration provide both 
the maximum degree of reliability and the ability to maintain equipment 
without more than two circuit outages. The use of the ring bus arrange­
ment is limited to no more than four circuits. For applications of 
more than four circuits, the breaker-and-a-half scheme should be used.
5.2 Breaker Failure Protection [16]
In the past, it was standard practice to backup transmission, line 
protection simply by overreaching primary protection to line sections 
beyond the remote bus. Selectivity of this remote backup depends main­
ly upon the time settings of the relays involved. Frequently, unneces­
sary tripping and service interrupting occurred. Remote backup* in 
addition to not being selective, may also not be sensitive enough 
because of the relatively small proportion of the total fault current 
flowing from the remote bus. This is true especially when very long 
transmission lines are involved.
With the advent of extra high voltage systems and increasing con­
cern about service continuity and possible breaker failures,, a trend 
to use breaker failure protection is developing. Unlike remote backup 
protection, this local backup is applied at a local station. If the pri­
mary relays fail, local secondary relays will trip the local breakers. 
In case the local breaker fails, either the primary or the secondary 
relays will initiate the breaker failure protection to trip all local 
breakers adjacent to the failed breaker. It should be noticed that 
although breaker failure protection has advantages and is widely used 
now, remote backup protection can not be completely eliminated.
Breaker failure protection is usually applied to equipment such 
as generators, transformers, and substation buses. In this section, 
basic schemes and operation theory of breaker failure protection will 
be discussed. Typical schemes for' various equipment will be given in 
the subsequent section.
Figure 5.1 illustrates a basic simplified breaker failure scheme.
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Operation of either the primary or the secondary relays will trip the 
circuit breaker and start the timer 62 through auxiliary relays 62X 
and 62Y. If the circuit did not open before 62 times out, this indi­
cates a failure to clear the fault. Then failure detector (device No. 
50BF shown in the figure) will energize a hand-reset multi-contact 
auxiliary relay 86BF, which in turn will trip all the adjacent breakers. 
Usually, the 86BF relay is also arranged to block reclosing, to initiate 
transfer trip, and to stop carrier with blocking-type pilot relaying.
Normally, timer 62 should be supervised by instantaneous overcur­
rent relay 50BF rather than the breaker "a" contact. This is because 
the "a" contact may be open while the main contacts in a damaged breaker 
are actually closed. Three overcurrent units used can be set below 
minimum fault current for better sensitivity. Where transformer faults 
do not provide sufficient-current to operate 50BF relays, a transformer 
differential relay contact can be used instead, supervised by a breaker 
"a" contact.
It is recommended practice that, (i) one breaker-failure circuit 
per breaker be applied, regardless of substation bus configurations, 
(ii) all adjacent breakers be tripped, regardless of fault location, 
and (iii) one timer per breaker be used, rather than one timer per bus. 
This practice will provide maximum flexibility in design and, more 
important, maximum selectivity.
5.3 Typical Schemes for Breaker Failure Protection
As stated in the last section, current flow should cease shortly 
after the trip circuit is energized in a properly functioning breaker. 
The time interval between trip energization and current flow cessation
is the breaker interrupting time. If interruption does not occur in 
about this much time, the breaker is assumed to have failed and the 
breaker failure relaying should initiate tripping of adjacent and/or 
remote breakers to isolate the protected breaker. Today, breaker fail­
ure protection is mostly used in high voltage substation bus protection. 
In this section, breaker failure protection for various bus configura­
tions will be discussed [16].
Figure 5.2 shows the simplest breaker failure scheme for the single 
bus configuration using one timer per bus. In transmission line protec­
tion, it is general practice to connect primary and secondary line re­
lays to separate current transformers and separately fused direct cur­
rent supplies as shown in the figure. Two zener diodes TRB-2 are used 
to prevent false indication of supervision lights, R and W. The zener 
diode inside each overcurrent detector isolates the multiple trip cir­
cuits of all overcurrent detectors on the same bus so that only the 
desired target will drop.
Figure 5.3 shows breaker failure relaying for the same bus arrange­
ment using one timer per breaker. Although using a separate timer for 
each breaker is more costly than a timer for each bus, the following 
advantages can pay for the price:
(1) If the breakers on the bus have different interrupting times, 
the common timer must be set to accommodate the slowest breaker. Sep-
a rate timers provide faster backup clearing for faster breakers.
(2) If a fault begins on one line and subsequently spreads to 
another, the common timer might misoperate and strip the bus. As the 
number of lines increase, it might become impossible to set the timer 
properly.
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(3) With separate timers, the bus can be reconfigured without 
rewiring the breaker failure circuits.
The telephone relay TX as shown in the figure should be used when 
breaker failure initiate auxiliary relays 62X and 62 Y are energized 
by potential polarized relays. This is because of the possible col­
lapse of polarizing potential during bus faults.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show breaker failure relaying for the breaker- 
and-a-half bus and the ring bus, respectively. The basic functioning 
of these schemes is the same as for the single bus, and requires no 
further explanation. To conclude this section, an overall protection 
scheme for a generator pair is shown in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The 
scheme includes both generator and bus breaker failure relaying.
5.4 Digital Computer Applications on System Supervision and Control
5.4.1 SCADA Systems ■
SCAD A systems for power system applications are designed to provide 
remote control and monitoring of substation and power plant equipment 
from the system control center. The equipment should be controlled 
and monitored by a local remote terminal unit (known as RTXJ) which in 
turn is under the direct control of the S'CADA central processor* Cowr 
municationS' link between RTU’s and the SCADA Master station can be 
▼O'ice grade,, telephone,, Microwave,, or power line carrier circuit, de­
pending upon particular application requirements'.
Information flow between the master station and BLIP1 s is M-direc- 
tiociai. Brills transmit status, analog, and digital inf o ration  to the 
station; the master station, on the other hand, issues control cooniaads 
to RTUs. Status information includes dry contact open/closed messages
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Figure 5.7 SUBSTATION PROTECTION SCHEME
and is used for such functions as alarms, system topology update, etc. 
Analog information includes variable voltage and current levels and is 
used for transmitting such quantities as line voltages, currents, watts, 
vars, frequency, turbine and/or generator temperature, wind speed and 
transformer tap position. Digital words represent information such as 
total number of contact transitions since last polling, etc. Control 
information is usually of a digital nature and contains the address of 
the equipment under control and control signal itself. It usually ac­
complishes a relay closure which in turn controls an appropriate item 
of substation or power plant equipment such as breaker close/open, 
transformer tap raise/lower and generator governor raise/lower.
In addition to data acquisition and control discussed above, a 
modern SCADA system should also have the following functions:
(1) Data Base:
The effectiveness value of a SCADA system is primarily a function 
of the data processing efficiency of the digital computer subsystem as 
measured by data thruput. To enhance the data thruput, the SCADA sys­
tem requires an efficient and effective data base subsystem. Therefore, 
from the data thruput point of view, the data base is the heart of the 
SCADA system.
(2) Operating System (also known as the Executive):
The operating system is required to provide a real-time priority 
oriented processing environment and to allocate computer resources 
accordingly.
(3) Man-Machine Interface:
This sybsystem is designed to provide capabilities such as CRT dis­
plays, alarm generation, data entry, data logging and picture compiler.
(A) Performance Monitoring:
This subsystem functions to enhance the operational availability 
of the SCADA or central control system. Generally, every primary hard­
ware subsystem should have an identical unit for backup.
Each of these functions is a highly specialized topic and the design of 
a complete SCADA system may require huge engineering effort. Conse­
quently, no further discussion on SCADA systems will be given. In the 
subsequent paragraphs, emphasis will be placed exclusively on RTU de­
sign. An example is given to illustrate the organization and operation 
of a RTU system.
A remote terminal unit (RTU) is a part of a process controller 
and/or SCADA system in which automatic functions are implemented within 
the RTUs. An intelligent RTU is one in which much of the logic asso­
ciated with each function- has been programmed and is executed locally 
in a digital processor (usually microprocessor) instead of transmitting 
data to and processing in the central processor of the SCADA system.
The first point of consideration in RTU design is the content of 
data required. Usually it is the responsibility of the operations and 
application groups to determine what data is needed for power system 
operation, control and for data input to SCADA programs. They should 
also define the required data characteristics of accuracy, resolution, 
sampling period, range, format, etc. Generally speaking, an intelligent 
RTU should have the following basic functions and capabilities.
(1) Data Acquisition:
It includes (a) discrete inputs such as status monitoring, pulse
counting and pulse timing; (b) digital inputs such as byte codes, 
binary coded decimal and others; (c) analog inputs to maintain a fresh 
internal data base.
(2) Control Outputs:
Included are (a) supervisory and manually initiated control such 
as check back-before-operate interlocks, etc.; and/or (b) fully automa­
tic and software or firmware initiated control.
(3) Communications, including communications with SCADA master 
station and service communications interface to prevent the loss of 
data.
(4) Operational Security:
It includes (a) minimization of false commands and data due to 
communication errors, component failure, electromagnetic interface, 
etc.; (b) internal monitoring of analog reference inputs, power failure 
and restart, etc.
(5) Functional and Field Expandability:
Expandability includes processor time, memory, input and output 
resources, wiring and space spare for the future addition of new points 
or functions. As a rule, future expansion of points or functions should 
not require any modifications to the RTU controlling logic circuits.
In addition to these basic functions and capabilities, optional 
functions such as data concentration, sequence of events reporting, 
digital metering, digital relaying, control sequences and many others 
can also be implemented in an intelligent RTU as necessary.
After these functional requirements are defined, the operating en­
vironment for RTUs should be designed accordingly. The environment for
RTU operation must provide not only the data and instructions associated 
with a particular function but, more importantly, must provide these 
inputs in a predefined priority order. The controlling logic in an RTU 
processor must decide how, when and to whom the processing resources 
are to be allocated according to a predefined priority order. Methods 
generally used by the controlling logic to manage processing resources 
include event interrupts (a hardware contact is closed), time interrupt, 
timer interrupts (a predefined time period has elapsed) and flag (a 
predefined condition is recognized).
The next step is to determine whether hardware or firmware should 
be used for a particular function defined above. As a rule of thumb, 
those general purpose functions making up the microprocessor should be 
implemented in firmware; those special functions such as operational 
security in hardware. However, the trade-offs between hardware and 
firmware are actually an art and should be carefully studied for any 
particular application.
Possibly the most important design consideration related to RTU 
systems is how to manage the resources of the microprocessor such that 
data is not lost and is processed correctly. A communications interface 
is the key point in the consideration. As the number of points in­
creases, the microprocessor executive overhead may be overloaded by 
huge communication requirements so incurred. Generally used communica­
tions interface techniques include polling and interrupt approaches. 
Implementing a communications interface by interrupt technique requires 
that the microprocessor be able to handle external hardware interrupts 
in addition to the real time clock interrupts. The advantage of the
interrupting interface over the polling approach is a reduction of 
microprocessor executive overhead. In a well designed system, communi­
cations functions should not use more than 30% of microprocessor re­
source time.
As in the SCADA system, it is desirable that every primary hardware 
subsystem or module have an identical unit for backup. It is also pre­
ferable to have automatic switchover (known as failover), and recovery 
and restart characteristics to achieve high reliability and availability 
as usually required.
Figure 5.8 shows a functional block diagram of a RTU system. This 
system has capabilities ranging from a few status or analog points up 
to many hundreds of point types including SOE, set points, raise-lower, 
etc. It has a dual-redundant backup. It is divided into the following 
modules: common control, control and indication, accumulator, analog 
to digital, raise-lower and power supply module.
The common control module performs message buffering between the 
various point modules and communication subsystems. The central element 
is a microprocessor with communication to and from all other modules. 
The interrogation of the point modules is under direct control of the 
microprocessor and the remote scan program stored in ROM. Figure 5.9 
shows internal organization of the common control module. The watchdog 
timer is designed to provide a programmable timing signal which is fed 
into an interrupt generation logic circuit. If the timer is timed out, 
a signal is sent to initiate an interrupt to the CPU.
The control and indication module continuously scans its indication 
points and maintains a queue of all changes. On request from the SCADA
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master station, the module can report the number of state changes 
accumulated, point address, and the present state of each point. 
Remote control of a point requires the reception of two sets of point 
address. The module compares these two sets of point address; if they 
agree, the control operation will take place.
The analog to digital module digitizes each analog input in se­
quence and produce a serial bit pattern for serial transmission* The 
module in cooperation with a precision direct voltage source anid resis­
tive tap change potentiometer can also provide remote indication of 
transformer tap position in the SCADA master station.
The raise-lower module provides remote control of transformer tmp 
from the SCADA master station. As in the control module, two sets of 
point address are required 'before the operation occurs*
CHAPTER 6
BUSINESS ASPECTS OF ENGINEERING PROJECTS
During my internship, I was under the direct guidance of project 
managers. Consequently, I also gained broad experience in engineering 
project management. My activities in this area included market analy­
sis , feasibility study, vendors1 bid evaluation, and project supervi­
sion and control. This chapter will highlight some of my experience. 
It is divided into two parts; part one discusses life cycle of engineer­
ing projects, part two concentrates on legal aspects of engineering.
6.1 The Life Cycle of Engineering Projects
Generally speaking, the life cycle of an engineering project be­
gins with identification of needs (or market analysis), followed by 
feasibility study, preliminary design, detailed design, purchasing* 
formal design review, and ended with hand over and comp let Ion,. Inter­
weaving through these phases of project life is project supervision and 
control. In this section all these different stages will be briefly 
discussed.
The purpose of market analysis is to view the project over its 
life cycle on the basis of economic considerations. A market can exist 
due to either current deficiencies or anticipated future deflci.ei.ncie?s. 
The data collected at this stage is usually quite rough and a decision 
is usually made on the considerations of the market potential and size, 
competition, possible obsolescence, and so on.
The purpose of a feasibility study is to extend the market analy­
sis with the intent of arriving at a proposed system configuration in
response to an identified need. In general, feasibility studies in­
clude the following aspects:
(1) Technical study: choice of technologies, design require­
ments, manpower requirements, etc.
(2) Economic and financial study: cost-benefit analysis, cash 
flow study, adequacy of funds, supply-demand analysis, and marketing 
program.
(3) Social and political study: community resistance, legal con­
straints, environmental suitability, and so on.
The results of the feasibility study are generally presented in the 
form of a proposal to management or clients covering the aspects stated 
above.
Preliminary design constitutes the starting point of a design pro­
ject and directs toward defining a set of useful solutions or system 
configuration to the problem being addressed. It starts with the tech- 
.nical baseline for the system defined in the feasibility study and pro­
ceeds to translate the established system level requirements into de­
tailed qualitative and quantitative design requirements. Usually it 
includes functional analysis and allocation, trade-offs and optimiza­
tion, and synthesis. In this stage, the following specifications 
should be prepared by design engineers: system specification, develop­
ment specification, and procurement specifications.
The detailed design phase begins with the concept and configura­
tion derived through preliminary system design, and. includes system 
component design and interface, preparation of design documentation* 
In this stage specifications of process, material, and construction 
should be prepared.
Purchasing is one of the key engineering functions. It consists 
of purchase requisitions, sources of supply, request for quotation, 
source selection and quotation evaluation, and placement of purchase 
order.
The functions of formal design review are:
(a) It provides a formalized check of the project. Major problem 
areas are discussesd and resolved.
(b) It provides a common baseline for all project personnel*
(c) It provides a means for solving interface problems and pro­
motes the assurance that all system elements will be compatible.
The completion and hand over phase of a project prepares the pro­
ject for phasing out and hand over to another fora of administration* 
Project completion consists of scaling down and dismantling the pro­
ject organization. It also involves the transfer of project personnel, 
assets or other facilities.
Project supervision and control is the backbone to an engineering 
project. Generally speaking, it consists of accomplishments evaluation, 
expenditure control, and investment control. The tools generally used 
are simple bar chart, milestone chart, program evaluation and review 
technique (PERT), critical path method (CPM), PERT/COST, Gantt chart, 
and line of balance (LOB).
6*2 Legal Aspects of Engineering
Never before in its history has the engineering profession faced 
the legal exposure that it does today. The rapid expansion of technol­
ogy has stimulated equally rapid developments in the law. Merely keep­
ing abreast of developments in the laws that have a direct effect on
an engineer would be a full-time task. Lack of time will prevent engi­
neers from developing familiarity with all the laws that may affect 
the engineering profession. However, ignorance of the law is no excuse 
is still a valid maxim.
The engineer must develop a sixth sense that will alert him to 
possible legal implications and permit him to seek competent advice 
before undertaking any project. This sixth sense can be developed by 
acquiring an awareness of major legal concepts that affect the engineer­
ing profession. Of current significance to all engineers is the concept 
of product liability. "Product liability" is a collective term describ­
ing three legal theories. These theories, which form the basis for re­
covery against the manufacturer and seller of a defective product, are:
(1) breaches of express and implied warranty; (2) negligence; and (3) 
strict or absolute liability. Because of his relationship to the de­
sign and manufacture of products, there is a strong likelihood that the 
engineer will become involved in a product claim or litigation as an 
"expert." The engineer called upon to render technical assistance as 
an expert should ensure that he has the requisite educational back­
ground and practical knowledge regarding the subject of the contro­
versy. The engineer can also prove instrumental in avoiding product 
liability exposure by instigating and pursuing preventive management 
techniques.
CHAPTER 7
SOME MANAGERIAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR YOUNG ENGINEERS
C. R. Gow reported in his book [19] that the chief obstacles to 
the success of each individual or of the group comprising a unit were 
of a personnel and administrative rather than a technical nature. What 
Gow said in 1932 still holds true. This is largely due to the fact that 
99% of the emphasis in the training of engineers is placed upon purely 
technical or formal education.
In this chapter a set of "house rules" or professional code for 
young engineers will be discussed. They are results of my observations 
or experience during my internship. Although they are not exhaustive, 
they may be of worth to young engineers just starting their careers, 
and to "older" engineers as well who know these things perfectly well 
but who all to often fail to apply them in practice.
This chapter is divided into two parts; part one discusses purely 
personality and character considerations for engineers, part two con­
centrates on what a young engineer really needs to learn at once and 
consists of three sections - in relation to your work, in relation to 
your boss, and in relation to your associates and clients [20].
Just one point should be clarified before entering into the con­
text: none of these rules is theoretical or imaginary, and however 
obvious and bromidic they may appear, their repeated violation, in my 
experience, is a main source of frustration and embarrassment in an 
engineering career.
7.1 Character and Personality Considerations
The subject of personality and character is, of course, very broad 
and much has been taught in schools from the social, ethical, and reli­
gious points of view. In this section, the following considerations are 
given and discussed from a purely practical point of view based upon 
principles of general engineering practice.
One of the most important personal traits of engineers is the abi­
lity to get along with all kinds of people. This is rather a compre­
hensive quality but it defines the prime requisite of personality in 
any type of industrial organization. Of course, it is a mistake to try 
too hard to get along with everybody merely by being agreeable and 
friendly on all occassions. You must earn the respect of your asso­
ciates by demonstrating your will to stand up for your belief. This is 
extremely important, especially when you know you are in the right. If 
you can be pushed around easily, the chances are that you will be pushed 
around. Just remember do not be too affable. There will be times when 
you do well to start a fight yourself, when your objectives are worth 
fighting for.
Self-respect is another important character for engineers. One of 
the most striking phenomena of an engineering office is the transparency 
of character among the members of any group who have been associated for 
any length of time. In fact, it frequently happens that a man is much 
better known and understood by his associates, collectively, than he 
knows and understands himself. It is also usually true that people 
respect only those who respect themselves. Consequently, regard your 
personal integrity as one of your most important assets and maintain
the highest standard of ethics of which you are capable.
It is also important to note that engineering is essentially a 
gentleman's profession, and a little profanity may go a long way. 
Therefore, watch your p's and q's and be careful of your personal 
appearance.
Dependability is another important personal trait for any success­
ful engineer. In fact, a reputation of dependability and reliability 
can be one of your most valuable assets.
7.2 In Relation to Your Work
Rule 1 : No matter how menial and trivial your early assignments 
may appear, give them your best efforts.
Many young engineers feel that the minor chores of a technical 
project are beneath their dignity and unworthy of their professional 
training. They are anxious to prove their extraordinary capability in 
some major enterprise. Actually, the spirit and effectiveness with 
which you tackle your first humble tasks will usually be carefully 
watched and may affect your entire career. Remember, there is always 
a premium upon the ability to get things done. Do your present job 
well and the future will take care of itself.
Rule 2 : In carrying out a project, do not wait for others to hand 
you results; go after your results and keep everlastingly after them.
This is one of the first things a young engineer has to learn in 
entering engineering business. It is not sufficient to place the order 
and sit back waiting for the result. In fact, most jobs move in direct 
proportion to the amount of follow-up and expediting applied. Look 
immediately for some way around each obstacle encountered and keep the
job rolling without losing momentum.
Rule 3: When sent out on any field assignment, stick with it and 
see it through to a successful finish.
Rule 4: Before asking for approval of any major action, have a 
definite plan and program worked out to support it.
It always pays for the time to prepare a well considered proposal 
rather than a half-baked one. OR you will not get credit for your 
great ideas.
Rule 5 : Strive for conciseness and clarity in oral or written 
reports.
There is a wisespread tendency among engineers to surround the 
answer to a simple question with so many preliminaries and commentaries 
that the answer itself can hardly be understood. It is so difficult to 
get a clear answer out of the answer that its usefulness is thereby 
greatly diminished. Therefore, try to convey the maximum of significant 
information in the minimum time and by the minimum words.
Rule 6: Don’t be timid, speak up and express yourself and promote 
your ideas.
Many young engineers tend to think that their job is simply to do 
what they are told to do. Of course, there are times when it is very 
wise and prudent to keep your mouth shut, but, as a rule, it pays to 
express your point of view whenever you can contribute something.
Rule 7 : Be extremely careful of the accuracy of your statements.
This sounds almost as trite as one plus one equals two, but many 
engineers lose the confidence of their superiors and associates by 
habitually guessing when they do not know the answer to a direct ques­
tion. Remember next time, if you do not know, say so, but always say, 
"I will find out as soon as possible."
7.3 In Relation to Your Boss
To get along with your boss, the basic principle is that he must 
know what is going on in his territory. From this idea are derived 
the following rules.
Rule 1 : Do not overlook the fact that you are working for your
boss.
It is not uncommon for young engineers, in their impatient zeal 
to get things done, to ignore the boss, or attempt to go around him. 
Sometimes they move a little bit faster that way for a while, but even­
tually they find that such tatics do not work at all.
Rule 2 : Whatever the boss wants done takes top priority.
Unless you obtain permission it is unwise to put any other project 
ahead of a specific assignment from your own boss. As a rule, always 
take for granted that your boss has good reasons for wanting his job 
done now. Also, if you are instructed to do something and you subse­
quently decide it is not worth doing because of new data or events, 
d o n’t forget to inform your boss of your intentions and reasons.
Rule 3 : Try your best to inform your boss of all significant 
developments.
Since your boss is constantly called upon to account for, defend, 
and explain your activities to the higher-ups as well as to coordinate 
these activities with other departments, he needs to know all informa­
tion promptly and accurately.
Rule 4 : Do not be too anxious to follow the boss’s leads.
In general, the program laid down by the department head is tenta­
tive, and is intended to serve only until a better program is proposed
and approved. Therefore, do not just follow the lines laid down by 
your boss. Try to sell your ideas to him and make contributions.
Rule 5 : Be as particular as possible in the selection of your
boss.
It is well known that the influence of the senior engineer, or 
even the boss, is a major factor in molding professional character of 
younger engineers. Consequently, if your boss turns out to be somewhat 
less than half the man he ought to be, transfer to some other company 
at the first opportunity. Remember, a person who constantly plays golf 
with a dub becomes a dub.
7.4 In Relation to Your Associates and Clients
Rule 1 : Never invade the territory of any other department without 
the knowledge and consent of the executive in charge.
Rule 2 : In all transactions be careful to deal-in everyone who 
has a right to be in.
Be especially careful about whom you mark for copies of letters, 
memos, etc., when the interests of other departments are involved.
Rule 3 : When you are dissatisfied with the services of another 
department, make your complaint to the individual most directly respon­
sible for the function involved.
Complaints made to a man’s superior should be resorted to only 
when direct appeal fails. Give the man a fair chance to correct the 
grievance before filing a complaint with his superior.
Rule 4 : In dealing with customers and outsiders, remember that 
you represent the company, ostensibly with full responsibility and 
authority.
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
During a one year internship, I made the following contributions 
to the firm:
(1) Technical Activities - I designed a protective relaying scheme 
for the 480 MW power plant, microprocessor-based SCADA and SOE systems.
I also designed the power plant overhead and underground distribution 
circuits as well as substations.
(2) Engineering Services - Designing a complete engineering pro­
gress control chart and helping the Project Manager to prepare cost 
control charts for a project which cost over $1.4 million merely for 
engineering.
(3) Standardization of the managerial procedures for young engi­
neers in the firm. This report summarizes and highlights the results 
of this standardization process. It is prepared to be a training manual 
for young engineers just starting their engineering careers.
This report is divided into two parts. Part one emphasizes the 
following technical design guidelines:
(1) Fundamentals of Electrical Power System Design
Technical design tools such as short circuit current calculation, 
ampacity of electrical conductors, instrument transformers, and the 
R-X diagram.
The short circuit current calculation includes both maximum and 
minimum current calculations under fault conditions. The maximum fault 
current values are used to select adequate interrupting ratings and to
check the ability of power system components to withstand both mechani­
cal and thermal stresses. The minimum values are needed to check the 
sensitivity requirements of protective relays. For overall coordina­
tion of system protective devices, both the maximum and the minimum 
values are often required.
Under normal operating conditions, the prime considerations in the 
applications of electrical conductors are ampacity, maximum allowable 
voltage drop, and energy losses.
Under fault conditions, mechanical considerations such as minimum 
required mechanical strength and maximum allowable deflection usually 
govern the selection and design of electrical installations.
Instrument transformers are used to protect personnel and appara­
tus from high voltage and to allow reasonable insulation levels in 
relays, meters, and other- instruments. Their performance is critical 
in protective relaying. Consequently, performance estimation of in­
strument transformers is elaborated in the report.
The R-X diagram is another important tool for protective relaying 
design. It integrates both system operation conditions and relay char­
acteristics in the same diagram. Its applications are also illustrated 
in Chapter 2.
(2) Generator Protection
Generator fault protection functions to detect any faults either 
internally in stator windings or externally in terminal leads feet srftMin 
the generator relaying zone. It includes differential and stator ground 
fault protection. On the other hand, generator abnormal protection is 
designed to protect the following abnormal operation conditions: loss
of excitation, motoring, negative sequence current, uncleared system 
fault, overloading, overvoltage, overspeed, grounded rotor and loss of 
synchronism.
(3) Power Transformer Protection
Power transformer relaying includes fault detecting devices and 
abnormal operation sensing devices. Fault detecting devices function 
to protect the system and limit damage in the event of a fault. Abnor­
mal operation relaying is designed to protect the transformer and in­
cludes overtemperature and system backup protection.
(4) Power System Supervision, Protection and Control
Miscellaneous items such as transmission substation configurations,
breaker failure protection and SCADA system design are discussed.
Part two gives business aspects of engineering projects and in- 
house guidelines to young - engineers. These guidelines are given to help 
young engineers who are starting their professional careers to adjust 
themselves to the industrial environment. The guidelines fit into the 
following four topics: character and personality consideration, in 
relation to your work, in relation to your boss,, and in relation to 
your associates and clients.
From a personal point of view, my internship has been one of the 
best possible and the three internship objectives have been met. The 
positive attitude of my internship supervisor, Mr* E. E* H0*gw©'0«dl, and 
all of my colleagues was a significant factor in the success of wy 
internship.
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APPENDIX I
Figure 7.1 shows a simplified circuit for fault current calcula­
tion. Since a fault may occur at any instant defined by 9 shown in 
the figure, when 0 is the angle between the instant of positive volt­
age crest and the instant of closing switch. Expressed in mathematical 
form, the fault current if for a single line to ground fault is
L if = ig(t) = E (coswt + 0) 
dt
— ,. if =JL (coswt + 0) 
dt L
if(t) = JL. sin (wt + 0) + constant 
WL
Initial condition at t=o, 
if (o) = o
constant - _ E
WL
if(t) = J L  [sin (wt + 0) - sin 0]
WL
To find 0 values such that if(t) will have maximum value
_A_ if = J L  [cos (wt + 0) - cos0] 
d q WL
= 0
cos wt cos0 - sin wt sin 0 - cos0 = 0 
(coswt-1) cos0 - sin wt sin0 = 0
and the peak of if occurs at wt = *180°, that is, a half-cycle after 
the fault occurrence.
EFFECT OF INSTANT FAULT OCCURRENCE 
ON THE FAULT CURRENT if
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Consequently, the maximum fault current can be shown as
if (t) = J L  [-coswt * 1]
WL
peak value of if(t) is 2 sfl times the rms value of its
symmetrical component (-JL coswt)*
WL
:l Ip = peak of if (t)
= 2 y T  is
The rms value of if (t) over the first half-cycle after fault occturrMC*
JL
WL
1-2 coswt + (cos dut
Ip :s= 2 Ia * 1*63 l a
yiTi
OlnriiBwiisly,
ia = y ? ! ®
'fin prove that the fladam short circuit force « •  1 
conductor, the short circuit mist occur at 0 * 4.5% eoMider #
three phsfie sjraraetrical fault#
ifk = J L  [ sin (wt + 0) - sin 0]
WL
kfc = ^ [sin (wt + 0 - 120°) - sin (0- 120°)] 
WL
Fs = short circuit force on phase R conductor
[sin (wt + 0 + 120°) - sin (wt + 0 
-sin (0 + 120°) + sin (0 - 120°)] 
[sin (wt + 0) - sin 0]
sin (wt + 20) sin2 _wt
2
-45.6 sin2 wt cos (wt +  20)
d@ ' 2 
D(WL)2(10)7
cos (wt +  28) = 0
= 5.7 
D(WL)2(10) 7
-  22.8 
D(WL)2(10)7
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